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THE ORIGIN OF BELIEF AMONG THE GREEKS IN THE DIVINITY OF THE HEAVENLY BODIES

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Dedicated to William Scott Ferguson

IT IS a fact which is not justly appreciated that the Sun and the Moon had almost no cult in the early and classical age of Greece except for the Sun at Rhodes, a cult which is reasonably suspected to be of foreign origin.[1] Helios and Selene were, of course, considered to be gods, but in mythology. Those scholars who have eagerly tried to find evidence for their cult ought to remember the statements of Aristophanes and Plato that Helios and Selene were barbarous gods.[2] These two certainly knew the cults of their compatriots better than we do. On the other hand, the Sun cult was very popular and wide-spread in Roman times and became finally the last State religion of the Empire. It came from the Orient, and the mediator and the reason of its popularity was astrology. So the question arises: why did the Greeks accept the astrology which they rejected in an earlier age, and why did they begin to pay a cult to Helios to whom they had shown no veneration in earlier times? Did they simply succumb to a foreign religion or were there intrinsic reasons which contributed to this result?

In order to answer the question we have first to turn to what was said in criticism of the old religion, i.e. the scientific criticisms of the philosophers and their attempts to explain from natural causes the origin of the belief in gods. It was apparent that many Greek gods were nature gods, e.g. Zeus, the thrower of the thunderbolt and the sender of rain. Their names could

[1] See my remarks Archiv für Religionswissenschaft, xxx, 1933, p. 141.
[2] Aristoph., Pac., V. 406 seqq.; Plato, Cratylus, p. 397 C.

even be used metaphorically; Homer says Hephaistos instead of "fire." Here was a starting point for the philosophical explanations. Democritus put sudden and terrifying phenomena into the foreground. He says that when people in olden times observed the phenomena in the sky, e.g. thunder and lightning, comets, solar and lunar eclipses, they were frightened and believed these to be caused by gods.[3] We may compare the famous drama Sisyphus by Critias, who was one of the thirty tyrants and at the same time a disciple of the sophists. He says that some wise man invented the gods in order to prevent men from committing crimes in secret and placed them in that region in which man observed the phenomena which terrified him or were useful to him, the lightning, the frightful thunder, the star-lit sky, the glowing mass of the sun, and the rain.[4] The sophist Prodicus put the useful into the foreground. He says that the people of olden times considered all things which were useful to man to be gods, e.g. the sun, the moon, rivers, and springs, because of their usefulness, just as the Egyptians believe that the Nile is a god. For this reason they called bread Demeter, wine Dionysus, water Poseidon, etc.[5]

The criticism of the gods censured their immorality of which the myths told so much, their arbitrariness, and their incalculability, which was apparent in the fates which befell man, and from the fact that various peoples believed in various gods the conclusion was drawn that the gods existed not φύσει but νόμῳ, i.e. they were invented by man. It was urged that the gods who were the protectors of law and morality ought themselves to follow law and morality.

The origin from which many of the old gods had sprung was still remembered and man is always prone to recognize the hand of God in Nature. But he was not willing to recognize the will of any god in the senseless, arbitrary, and cruel phenomena of Nature; he demanded order and justice from the gods. Look, Aristophanes makes Socrates say, Zeus smites with his thunderbolt the mountain tops and the high oaks, and his own temples,

[3] Democritus, Test. A 75 in Diels-Kranz, Fragm. der Vorsokratiker.

[4] Critias fragm. 1 V. 27 seqq. in Nauck, Fragm. tragicorum 2.

[5] Prodicus B fragm. 5 loc. cit.

not the perjurers and reckless ones.[6] Among the phenomena of nature there was, however, one class which satisfied both the new demand of order and law and the old conception of divine powers in Nature, the heavenly bodies. According to mythology the heavenly bodies were gods. The regularity and conformity with law of their motions were emphasized by the remarkable progress of the science of astronomy in the beginning of the fourth century B.C. which was due especially to Eudoxus of Cnidus, who was closely associated with Plato.

The effect of all this was that philosophy took up this line when it turned to the defence of the belief in gods. The man responsible is Plato. In the Cratylus his special interest is etymological. He says that the earliest inhabitants of Greece held only those to be gods in whom many of the barbarians now believe, namely the sun and the moon, the earth, the stars and the sky. For seeing that they were in ceaseless motion they named them from this property θεούς, from θεῖν.[7] He here hints at an idea which was to be of the greatest importance. We shall have to come back to it. At this point, Plato counts as gods not only the heavenly bodies and their abode, the sky, but also the earth; but it appears that the first-mentioned are more important and that the earth is added in order to include the whole universe as is done in the old oath formulas.

In the Timaeus we find an important innovation, the God who created the Universe, the Demiurge. Greek myth did not attribute the creation of the world to the gods — in this paper I do not take the Orphics and Pythagoreans into account —, but Cosmos was of itself evolved from Chaos. Only certain things or men are created or inventions made mostly by some culture hero. The Creator of the Universe is an outcome on the one hand of the highest philoscphical principle, and on the other of the teleological conception of the universe. "The Demiurge contemplates the cosmos with its body and soul," says Professor Cornford, "so far as they have yet been organised. The body appears with its turning rings; animated by soul, whose motions these rings symbolise; it is a living and moving *agalma* (i.e. image of the gods). . . . But the everlasting

[6] Aristoph., Nub., V. 399 seqq.

[7] Plato, Cratylus, p. 397 C.

divinities have still to take their places in this vacant shrine. These are the 'heavenly gods,' the stars, the planets, and Earth, all of which are presently described as 'living creatures, everlasting and divine.'" [8] The heavenly bodies are divine, but there is a highest Divinity, the Creator of the Universe. It appears that the burden of the proof of his existence rests on the celestial phenomena, the orderly revolutions of the heavenly bodies.

In a passage of the work of his old age, the Laws, Plato's purpose is to convince the unbelievers and atheists, of whom there were many, of the existence of the gods. He produces two well-known arguments. One is the argument *e consensu omnium gentium*, the other the so-called *physico-teleologicum*. It is in truth not difficult, he says, to show that gods exist. First there are the earth and the sun and all the stars and the well ordered seasons divided into years and months, and secondly all Greeks and barbarians believe in the existence of gods.[9] The orderly course of the seasons and the calendar depend on the heavenly bodies, and this is evidently the most telling argument for his opinion that the heavenly bodies have self-moving, divine souls. Recently it has been proved that Plato in his old age learned to know Iranian dualism and Chaldaean astrology; when we consider the ideas here treated it is understandable that he took an interest in them.[10]

The doctrine of the heavenly bodies takes a very large place in the appendix to the Laws, the Epinomis. Here there is no need to discuss whether it was written by Plato himself or by some follower, e.g. Philippus of Opus.[11] It takes up Plato's lines of thought in his old age and shows where they point. The heavenly bodies are living beings and divine, they have the

[8] Plato, Timaeus, p. 37 C; F. M. Cornford, Plato's Cosmology, p. 101.

[9] Plato, De leg., p. 886 B.

[10] This subject has been very vigorously discussed. I cite W. Jaeger, Aristoteles, Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung, 1923; English translation by R. Robinson, 1934. J. Bidez, Platon, Eudoxe de Cnide et l'Orient, Acad. belgique, classe de lettres, xix, 1933, pp. 195 and 245; E. de Places, Platon et l'astronomie chaldéenne, Mélanges Cumont, 1936, pp. 129 seqq.

[11] The last defence of its genuineness is by H. Raeder, Platons Epinomis, Kong. Danske Videnskabernes Selskab, Hist.-filol. Meddelelser, xxvi: 1, 1938.

most beautiful bodies and the most perfect souls; they may be immortal (p. 981 f.). Man ought to understand that the heavenly bodies and their revolutions are endowed with intellect, because they always and changelessly perform the same revolutions (p. 982 C). Nobody but God is the cause of this (p. 983 B). The heavenly bodies are either to be glorified as being actual gods or considered to be likenesses of gods which the gods themselves have made (p. 983 E). In regard to Zeus and Hera and the other gods everyone may make the laws he pleases. The visible gods, the greatest and most venerable ones who cast their gaze everywhere, must be considered as being the foremost (p. 984 D). The writer continues by setting forth a fundamental doctrine of astrology. "And since the heaven is completely filled with living beings, let us say that all of these bring word of everything to one another and to the gods in the highest regions, since the middle forms of living being move with easy flight both to the earth and to the whole heaven" (p. 985 B).[12] He hopes that the Greeks will care for all these gods better than the barbarians do,[13] using their education, the Delphic oracles, and all lawful forms of cult (p. 988 A).

Still more important than the Epinomis in this respect is the greatest disciple of Plato, Aristotle. The writings of his which were most widely circulated and read, the Dialogues, are lost, but the existing fragments suffice to prove the extreme importance attributed in them to the divinity of the heavenly bodies. In one fragment he gives philosophical explanations of the origin of the belief in gods. He states two reasons: one is psychic phenomena — dreams, enthusiasm, presages —, the other is celestial phenomena. When man observed the course of the sun by day and the revolutions of the stars by night, he came to the belief that a god exists who is the cause of these

[12] Translation by J. Harward.

[13] The words hint at the Chaldaean origin of the astrology. J. Bidez, Rev. de philol. xxix, 1905, p. 319, has proved that in p. 987 C the slowest planet according to the best manuscripts is called Ἡλίου, not Κρόνου ἀστήρ. According to the Chaldaean doctrine Saturn was the sun of the night. That the Greek names of the planets used in the Epinomis were soon ousted by the Babylonian ones shows the rapid spread of the Chaldaean doctrine; F. Cumont, Babylon und die griechische Astronomie, Neue Jahrb. f. klass. Altertum, xxvi, 1911, pp. 1.

orderly motions.[14] In a passage translated by Cicero the same idea is expounded. If some people who lived beneath the earth and had heard that there was such a thing as divine power ascended to its surface, he says, and suddenly beheld the earth and the sea, the sky and the winds, the greatness and beauty of the sun which causes the day and whose absence causes night, the star-spangled sky, the waxing and waning of the moon, the rising and setting of the heavenly bodies, and their eternal and unchanged revolutions, if they beheld all this they would surely think that they were gods and that all these great glories are a work of the gods.[15] In a fragment which has much the same wording he says that the first man who beheld all this would seek for the demiurge who created it and would think that it had not come into being by itself but had been created by a higher and eternal power which is god.[16]

In order to prove the seriousness of the problem for the thinking of Aristotle I cannot avoid touching in a few words upon his esoteric writings in regard to his so-called theology. To use the words of von Arnim, with Aristotle the metaphysics which he himself calls *πρώτη φιλοσοφία* or even *θεολογία* is the doctrine of god as *πρώτη ἀρχή*, i.e. as the first *οὐσία*, by which the existence of the cosmos, its life, and its motion is conditioned.[17] Here we come back to the problem of which we found the embryo in Plato's Cratylus, the problem of motion. Aristotle realized its full importance for his metaphysics or what he himself calls theology; but it was so difficult and so important for his thinking that he only slowly and gradually made up his mind. Considerable attention has been paid to this central point of the development of Aristotle's thought since Professor Jaeger raised the question.[18] His final theory of the transcendent and un-

[14] Aristotle, fragm. 12 Rose in Sextus Emp., adv. dogm., iii, 20 seqq.

[15] Cicero, de nat. deorum, ii, 95.

[16] Aristotle, fr. 13 in Sextus iii, 26 seq.

[17] H. von Arnim, Die Entstehung der Gotteslehre des Aristoteles, Sitz.-ber. Akad. Wien, Phil.-hist. Klasse, 212, Bd. 5. Abh., 1931, p. 1.

[18] W. Jaeger, op. cit.; H. von Arnim, op. cit.; W. K. C. Guthrie, The Development of Aristotle's Theology, Class. Quarterly, xxvii, 1933, pp. 162, and in the introduction to his translation of Aristotle, De caelo, in the Loeb Classical Library, the proof-sheets of which I have been able to use, thanks to the kindness of the author.

moved mover does not concern us here. He started from Plato's theory of spontaneous motion, the self-mover which is identified with the soul. In his De caelo he seems to have proceeded to this point. He describes the heavenly system as the foremost and highest divinity and says that there is nothing so powerful as to move it,[19] and in another passage states that the activity of a god is immortality, i.e. eternal life. Therefore the divine must be characterized by eternal motion.[20] In a passage of the dialogue De philosophia quoted by Cicero his view is different. He ascribes voluntary motion, sense perception, and divinity to the stars.[21] For our purpose it is not necessary to enter into a discussion of the various stages of Aristotle's theories on motion or of the place which the immanent soul of the stars has in these theories. Mr. Guthrie remarks pertinently: "The divinity of the stars was an article of the Platonic faith which it could never occur to Aristotle to doubt," and as regards De caelo, that "we are here enabled to see a stage of Aristotle's thought at which the sphere of the fixed stars, the highest corporeal entity, is at the same time the highest entity of all. It is this which, swinging round with the ceaseless self-caused motion that is the outcome of its inner nature, brings about the motion of everything else in the universe and deserves the name of 'foremost and highest god, entirely immutable and owning no superior.'" [22]

I am not competent, nor is it my intention, to take up a discussion of the philosophical importance and complications of the problems involved. I wish only to draw attention to the consequences for religion of the opinions on the divinity of the heavenly bodies embraced by the great philosophers of the fourth century B.C. The criticism of the intelligentsia of the end of the fifth century B.C. had uprooted the old gods by denouncing their arbitrariness and immorality. To this purpose the demand for morality, justice and order was urged, and when the gods failed to fulfil this demand they were doomed. When

[19] Aristotle, De caelo, i, 9, p. 279 a, 30 seqq.

[20] Ibid. ii, 3, p. 286 a, 9. On passages in De caelo which seem to imply the transcendent mover see Guthrie loc. cit.

[21] Cicero, De nat. deorum, ii, 42 and 44 resp.

[22] Guthrie in his introduction to De caelo, pp. xxxii and xxvii resp.

philosophy with Plato and Aristotle took up the defence of the belief in gods it pointed to the purposeful structure of the universe which could not be understood unless a Supreme Being had created it, and unless it were animated by a World soul. Philosophy pointed to the ceaseless and regular revolutions of the heavenly bodies as a proof of their divinity. They were visible gods. The criticism of the unbelievers was stopped, but the old gods were done with, — the Epinomis speaks very scornfully of them. New gods took their place.

The arguments of the intelligentsia had trickled down among the general public — Aristophanes proves it; it is to be expected likewise that the general public heard of the opinions of the great philosophers and took some notice of them. The Creator of the Universe, not to speak of the World soul or the transcendent mover, was too lofty a god and too speculative a conception. But there were the visible gods, the heavenly bodies whom mythology knew as gods from of old. People were ready to accept them as real gods if they only could believe that they interfered in human life. Astrology taught this lesson, but Greek popular belief met it half-way.

From of old peasants and seafarers were wont to observe the risings and settings of the stars as signs of the time when certain works were to be done, when rain and storm or heat and sickness would come. Homer knows the baleful appearance of Sirius and Hesiod has many such indications. It appears that people believed that the stars caused the changes of weather. In a later time there was a dispute εἰ τὰ ἄστρα ποιεῖ ἢ σημαίνει, whether they cause or only indicate such changes.[23] It is needless to say that this belief of common people would make them ready to accept the thesis of the divinity of the heavenly bodies proposed by the philosophers. The full consequences came, however, first with astrology. My purpose is to show that Greek philosophy and popular belief paved the way for that belief in the stars the lasting and dominating power of which is so well known.

[23] E. Pfeiffer, Studien zum antiken Sternglauben, 1916.

THE COMING OF THE PYTHIA

KURT LATTE

HAMBURG

THE commonly accepted idea of the evolution of the Delphian mantic may be outlined thus: There was first an oracle of the Mother Earth, working by incubation (cf. p. 16, later). Later on, Apollo took possession of it, but its character remained unchanged: the believers continued to receive revelation in dreams. Afterwards Dionysos went to Delphi and with him ecstasy entered into the cult. It was not until then that oracles were given by an inspired, i.e. ecstatic, priestess called Pythia.

This idea goes back to E. Rohde's famous work on the Greek beliefs in immortality (Psyche 2. 56 ff.). After a discussion of ecstasy in the cult of Dionysos and his introduction to Delphi, Rohde proceeds to argue that the new religion affected also the cult of Apollo by bringing in an ecstatic element: "Mit der mantischen Ekstase nimmt Apollon selbst in seine Religion ein dionysisches Element auf (l.c. 60)." Now it is clear that Rohde's argument is based on the antithesis between a calm and limpid, more rational form of religion, styled Apollinian, and an ecstatic one, appealing to the irrational in man, which is characteristic of the followers of Dionysos. This antithesis was first set forth by German romantics like Frederik Schlegel, in order to express the difference between the "Olympic" poetry of the old Goethe and their own production. In doing so, they wanted to imply that their works, though lacking the mellow clearness of the master, were perhaps able to make up for this defect by a clearer reckoning with the dark and irrational side of human nature. Later the young Nietzsche in his book on the Origins of Greek Tragedy popularized this terminology, overstating it in his usual way. Erwin Rohde, who unlike his greater friend had never freed himself from the impressions of his youth when he enjoyed a lively exchange of thought with Nietzsche, was clearly under the influence of this distinction when he wrote the lines quoted above; for him inspiration was identical with ecstasy and these were to be expected, not from Apollo, but from Dionysos. These few statements

may suffice to show that the whole theory started originally not from philological research, but from modern literary polemics, from a revolt against the rationalistic classicism of the eighteenth century; Apollo and Dionysos were nothing more than convenient symbols, and its application to the real gods of the ancient Greek religion was secondary. We need not discuss here the philosophical value of these notions which for a period were almost a commonplace in Germany, but we are bound to ask, whether the hypothesis of Rohde can be reconciled with the history of Greek religion.

Perhaps it may be useful to recall briefly the other forms of divination which existed in Greece. In addition to a secondary interpretation of sacrifices which in Olympia developed into a special mode of divination, we encounter the following forms: the flight of birds, which had been worked out into a detailed system as early as the fifth century B.C. (Dittenberger, Syll.[3] 1167), the casting of lots, the sound of the holy oak in Dodona, and omina (κληδόνες, ὀμφαί) interpreted partly by laymen, partly by expert soothsayers;[1] we may add to this last group all kinds of marvellous or peculiar events such as the appearance of the snake which foretells the duration of the war in the Iliad (2. 301 ff.). Furthermore there are dreams, especially dreams of incubation, i.e. dreams in holy places where, sleeping on the bare soil, you are in immediate contact with the divine power emanating from the earth. This survey sets in sharp relief the problem with which we are concerned: in opposition to all other kinds of Greek divination, in Delphi there exists a prophecy by inspiration working without any impulse from outside, and it is practised by a woman though usually in Greece only men functioned as seers and prophets.

The cult of Dionysos in Greece offers no explanation for these facts. Even Rohde did not succeed in discovering any earlier oracle of the god in Greece. The only instance he quotes is an oracle in Amphikleia, a small town in Phocis, mentioned in the second century A.D. by Pausanias (X 33. 11); we are

[1] For further details see my article Orakel in Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll's RE 830 ff. I take this opportunity to add that the supplement θεῶν [Π]ανομφαίων I proposed there, 831. 15, in the inscription of Aigai, was given beforehand by Höfer, Fleckeisens Jahrbb. 143, 1891, 367. I am indebted for this information to the kindness of L. Robert.

told that there were mysteries (so much is certain though the text of Pausanias has a gap), and divine cures by incubation, and a priest gave oracles, inspired by the god (κάτοχος ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ). About a generation after Pausanias an inscription mentions an ἀρχιερεὺς τοῦ μεγάλου θεοῦ Διονύσου (IG IX 1. 218) in the town. This instance does not prove anything, for in imperial times every god for the sake of his good reputation was obliged to heal and to tell the future. Moreover this Dionysos is called μέγας θεός, an epithet which always indicates oriental and syncretistic elements,[2] and he has mysteries which, as we have learned from Cumont (Les religions orientales dans le paganisme romain 4th ed. 1929, 195 ff.), point also to a syncretistic feature of the cult. Therefore, it is fairly certain that at Amphikleia we meet a late, orientalized form of Dionysos which can teach us nothing about the condition of the cult a thousand years before. Besides, in Amphikleia a male priest is the prophet as usual, and therefore an essential part of the problem, the functioning of a woman in Delphi, remains unexplained. Still less is proved by the fact that a late grammarian (Schol. Pind. Pyth. Hypoth. p. 2. 16 Drachm.), in explaining the metrical forms of the Pythian flute part, the νόμος Πυθικός, asserts that Dionysos was the first to give oracles from the tripod. This is a late invention like all other misstatements of the passage which tells that Apollo learned the art of divination from Pan, that the first owner of the oracle was the Night, etc. There can be no denying that all this is mere guesswork.

There is no evidence for a connection between Dionysos and any kind of mantic. But there is ample proof of the opposite: we have plenty of descriptions of the miracles achieved by the Bacchae: they draw milk and honey from the fountains (e.g. Aeschin. Sphett. in Aristid. II 23 Dind.), they suckle fawns and panthers (Eur. Bacch. 699 ff.), — but nowhere are they said to tell the future. As we have very rich sources on the cult of Dionysos, this time the *argumentum e silentio* holds good. On the other hand, there is not the slightest hint that the Pythia had anything to do with the cult of Dionysos; moreover, during the month when Apollo is absent from Delphi and Dionysos

[2] Bruno Mueller, ΜΕΓΑΣ ΘΕΟΣ Diss. Halle 1912 has collected the materials.

is in the centre of the cult, no oracles are given at all. Local tradition connects the Pythia with the Sibylla, and again there is no reason to suppose that the Sibyl ever belonged to any god other than Apollo.

On the whole, the general acceptance accorded to Rohde's theory seems based on an ambiguity in the word ecstasy. Usually the word means a strong agitation, produced by violent motions of the body (e.g. sacred dances) or by the use of narcotics and resulting in insensibility to all sensations from without. Consequently the imagination, uncontrolled by experience, may produce a kind of Fata Morgana, a seeming realization of secret dreams, and even bestow upon the individual for a moment an extraordinary strength. This is the case of the Bacchae. But the same insensibility may result from a purely mental process, from a last effort of abstraction as in the Neoplatonic mysticism, from intensity of prayer, etc. There the state of the body is unimportant; it can stay perfectly motionless during the whole time and even give the impression of being lifeless. In the Greek sense of the word, this is ἔκστασις too, modern terminology fluctuates, though perhaps we had better call it a trance.

There is no doubt that the state of the Pythia resembled the second form rather than the first. It is hardly advisable to sit on a tripod while your body goes through the spasms and convulsions of a "Bacchic" ecstasy. This view is confirmed by red-figured vase-paintings. Since these date from the same period as the well known pictures of the Bacchae on the so-called Lenaean-vases,[3] the objection that the art of that time was not yet able to represent ecstatic movements, does not work. Nevertheless, the Pythia is always given a perfectly calm attitude; the difference is outstanding and was felt by the Greeks themselves.

Thus it is impossible to discover any link between the inspi-

[3] E.g. the krater from Vulci (Roscher Mythol. Lex. V col. 579, fig. 2; Gerhard, Archaeol. Zeitung 1860, pl. 138, repeated in Daremberg-Saglio V 475, fig. 7070: it is an amusing instance for the power exercised by the dominant theory, that the writer of the article, in commenting on this picture, quotes from Bouché-Leclerq: sur le trépied râle (!) la Bacchante). — For the dancing Manads there are plenty of instances in Frickenhaus, Die Lenaeenvasen 72. Berl. Winckelmannsprogr. 1912.

ration of the Pythia and the forms of the cult of Dionysos. On the contrary, inspired women played an important rôle in the cult of Apollo. It is now generally acknowledged that Apollo came to Greece from Asia Minor;[4] his mother and sister and probably the god himself bear Anatolian names. The most important oracle of Apollo in that country (apart from the oracle of the Branchidae in Milet-Didyma) was in the Lycian Patara. There during the period when oracles were given, the priestess (*πρόμαντις*) was shut in every night in the temple (Hdt. 1. 182). Herodotus compares this curious fact with other rites in the cult of "Zeus" Belos in Babylon and of a "Zeus" in the Egyptian Thebes. In all these cases the god was supposed to visit his temple during the night and to have intercourse with the mortal woman. She was held to be his concubine. The belief in this kind of relation between a god and his priestess was widespread in Anatolian countries; this is shown by two inscriptions from Tralles which hitherto have been wrongly interpreted. The first is well known and often discussed:[5]

Ἀγαθῇ τύχῃ.
Λ. Αὐρηλία Αἰ-
[μ]ιλία, ἐκ προ-
γόνων παλλα-
κίδων καὶ ἀνι-
πποπόδων, θυ-
γάτηρ Λ. Αὐρ. Σε-
κούνδου Ση[τι-]
ου, παλλακεύσα-
σα καὶ κατὰ χρη-
σμὸν Διί

[4] This theory was first set forth by v. Wilamowitz Herm. 38. 575 ff. cf. id. Glaube d. Hellenen II 30. The opposition of Bethe, Antidoron, Festschrift f. Wackernagel 1923, 14 ff., gives no conclusive arguments. The deductions drawn in this paper are not based upon this theory, but if it is right, it furnishes one more argument for Wilamowitz.

[5] Ramsay, Cities and Bishoprics of Phrygia I, no. 115 and p. 95. Ramsay is responsible for the interpretation challenged in the text; it was accepted without further discussion by all other scholars who dealt with the inscription. For a bibliography see L. Robert, Etudes Anatoliennes 1937, p. 406; add Pappakonstantinos Αἱ Τράλλεις 1895, no. 33, F. Cumont, Les religions orientales dans le paganisme romain, 4th ed., p. 258, Ruge, RE VI A 2118.

The other one was recently published by L. Robert in his Etudes Anatoliennes (407), which give much new and important information, presented to the reader with model care and admirable learning:

Μελτίνη Μοσχᾶ,
παλλακή, μητρὸς
δὲ Παυλείνης τῆς
Οὐαλεριανοῦ φιλ-
τάτης,[6] παλλακευ-
σάσης ἐπὶ τὸ ἐξῆς
πενταετηρίσι β',
ἀπὸ γένους τῶν
παλλακίδων, Διί.

As far as my knowledge goes, all scholars who have dealt with these inscriptions agree in the view that we are faced with an instance of sacred prostitution, a rite which is specially attested for Lydia. Now it seems rather questionable whether it is a good recommendation for a courtesan never to wash her feet, but fortunately we need not discuss the matter here. We can follow simply the usage of the language, always the safest guide. Παλλακή in Greek never means a prostitute, but a concubine.[7] If you want a striking instance of the difference, look at the old law: there a man was authorized to slay the adulterer of his concubine (παλλακή) as well as of his wife (Dem. 23, 53), but he had no such right in the case of a courtesan (ὅσαι πεφασμένως πωλοῦνται Lys. 10. 19, Dem. 59. 67). It is almost certain that the παλλακαί of our inscriptions, during the period of their service, were not allowed to have intercourse with any mortal man, as Herodotus tells of the Babylonian and Egyptian priestesses and as is a matter of course in the case of the priestess of

[6] Robert understands Φιλτάτη as the second name of Paulina, a position of words which usually is found only where the father's name stands between nomen and cognomen after the Roman fashion. Therefore I prefer to take it as appellative for daughter like φίλτατοι children P. Oxy. I 135, 17 BCH XV 189. 133. 20. In the papyrus the position οἱ φίλτατοι καὶ ἡ γαμετή as compared with the usual τέκνα καὶ γυναῖκες leaves no doubt on the meaning. The use is often misunderstood.

[7] There can hardly be a better proof than the fact that the learned editors of the new Liddell and Scott gave the inscription a special heading in their article Παλλακή.

Apollo at Patara too. Of these it can be said that they belonged exclusively to the god they served. It is all to the good for this interpretation that we do not overrate the naïveté of society in imperial times by supposing that they boasted publicly of so delicate a matter as sacred prostitution. Unfortunately we cannot tell to which god the women of our inscriptions were addicted; Διί in the first belongs, as L. Robert (op. cit., 406. 4) justly remarks, only to κατὰ χρησμόν, and as Zeus (Larasios) was the main god of Tralles, he might well receive votive offerings from the priests of other gods in the town. Apollo himself owned one of the principal cults in Tralles (Milet I 3. 143. 67, for other instances see Ruge, RE VI A 2118) and he may just as well have been the deity to whose service the παλλακαί belonged. With all due reserve, we may surmise that the puzzling ἀνιπτοπόδες throws a little light on the problem. The word occurs only once more in the famous Homeric passage on the prophets of Dodona (Il. 16. 235), and though we do not fully understand the meaning of the rite, it seems very natural that it is to be connected with the mantic power of these men. It was probably thought to enhance that power by a continuous contact with the earth. This would lead us to surmise that at Tralles too the women were prophetesses. The only other explanation offered hitherto is Kretschmer's (Einleitung i.d. Geschichte d. griech. Sprache 87); he concluded from Indian parallels that the meaning was purely ascetic; this is another possibility which cannot be excluded, though it may be noticed that asceticism is as unusual among Greek priests as it is common in India.

So we learn from these documents that the relations between the priestess at Patara and the god are not isolated, but correspond to a common Anatolian rite. We are now entitled to interpret the story of Cassandra as a mythical reflex of it. The maiden princess who promised her favor to the god and was rewarded by the knowledge of the future bears a striking likeness to the priestess at Patara. Our oldest witnesses for this myth, unknown to the Iliad, are Pindar (Pyth. 11. 49) and Aeschylus (Agamemn. 1202 ff.), but there is no doubt that they followed an epic poem; as Cassandra's prophetic inspira-

tion played a rôle in the Cypria (Procl. Chrest. 103 Allen), it is very probable that the whole story was already told in this poem. The author of the Cypria, whose home was certainly in the east of Greece, has the credit for this impressive picture, developed out of a native rite: the seer who was endowed by the god with the dangerous gift of prophecy fails to fulfil her promise and is punished by the tragic fate of seeing all the coming disaster, and of warning in vain. Finally we have in Asia Minor the Sibyl, who was always connected with Apollo; here we even meet genuine ecstatic elements (Heracl. fr. 92 Diels), a fact which is doubtless due to the special bias of the Phrygian people; this country time and again gave birth to prophetesses of this kind, down to the Christian Montanists, and Cassandra herself in Euripides seems to bear some features of this type. That there was an original connection between Apollo and prophetic women is sufficiently shown by these instances.

Back of all this, there is a widespread form of religious thought, the conception of the *unio mystica* as sexual intercourse between a god and a human being. As is well known, this set of ideas varies from a primitive and crude realism to the most refined and spiritual forms.[8] But always it is conceived as an approach to the divine power and may be accompanied by some special revelation. At Patara it had, no doubt, originally its most primitive form: the priestess who was blessed by the favor of the god was also able to tell his will. But when the ladies of Tralles boasted of having been concubines of a god, this was merely one more satisfaction of the insatiable vanity and passion for titles characteristic of social life in imperial times. At that period, religious feeling was satisfied on other lines. The gods of the past and the rites of old ages had lost almost all power over the minds of mankind. A thousand

[8] Cf. Dieterich Mithrasliturgie 3d ed. 123 ff. and for sublimated forms E. Norden, Die Geburt des Kindes 92 ff. The materials from Greece and Rome have been collected by E. Fehrle, Die kultische Keuschheit im Altertum, Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten vol. VI, Giessen 1910. He is inclined to include in this category all priestesses who were in the service of a god. Therefore he ascribes the Pythia too to this kind of priesthood, but without any attempt of proof and without being aware that his explanation cannot be reconciled with Rohde's thesis.

years earlier, the priestess in the loneliness of the dark temple really felt the awe-inspiring presence of the god.

If we return now to Delphi, it has become clear that the Pythia was but the Greek form of a priesthood which from its very beginning belonged to the cult of Apollo; it was the god himself who brought his prophetess with him as he took possession of the Delphian rocks. To explain her existence, no hypothetical influences of other cults are needed. But it is characteristic of the spiritualizing process which all Oriental religions underwent in passing through the limpid and serene atmosphere of Greece, that hardly a trace of the original meaning of the rite was left. In the Heroic age, gods might have come to daughters of men, but in the clear daylight of common life, such a claim was *hybris* to the Greeks. It was the Delphian Apollo himself who stressed the distance between man, this "dream of a shadow," and the eternal gods, who never ceased to remind people of their human weakness. The Pythia became the instrument of the god, no more. At the time of Aeschylus, she was an old woman (Aesch. Eum. 38), a fact which excludes all other thoughts. But she wore still, as it seems, the dress of an unmarried woman. This is stated in a curious outline of the history of the oracle given by Diodorus (16. 26. 6 ff.). Originally, we are told, a young girl gave the oracles, but as once a Thessalian, named Echecrates, raped the Pythia, the Delphians decided that henceforward a woman over fifty had to function as priestess, though she wore still *παρθενικὴν σκευὴν καθάπερ ὑπόμνημα τῆς παλαιᾶς προφήτιδος*. We do not know the source of Diodorus in this part of his work, but E. Schwartz has shown that it was a very late rhetorical work of about 100 B.C. (RE V 682). The excursus on the history of the oracle, characterized by Diodorus himself as *μυθολογούμενον*, deserves little trust; among others it tells of the intoxicating exhalations in the adyton which notoriously never existed. But what he says about the virginal dress of the Pythia in his own times fits in with the vase-paintings and can hardly be supposed to be mere guesswork. This detail may be a last survival of a period when the Pythia was still more like the priestess at Patara than in historical times.

Be this as it may, the result of research is a welcome simplification of the history of the Delphian oracle. The Pythia came at the same time as Apollo himself, and the arrival of Dionysos, whatever its other consequences, brought about no revolution in the cult of Apollo.[9]

[9] May I propose one more simplification in the history of the oracle? It is commonly supposed there was a time when oracles at Delphi were given by drawing lots. This goes back to Lobeck's explanation of the common phrase ἀνεῖλεν ὁ θεός (Aglaophamus 814 not.). No other instance exists. The change in the methods of divination must have occurred when the oracle was still owned by the Earth; afterwards there is no place for it, as is shown above. Now in the first place, the word is used exclusively of Apollo (the only exception I know is Hdt. VI 69. 3), never of the oracles where dice were really used. Furthermore, in Greece there are no oracles where the drawing of a lot was essential, as in the Roman oracle of the Fortuna of Praeneste and perhaps among the Celtic tribes of the Po-valley (see my article Orakel in RE, col. 855). The Greek lots were really thrown, like our dice, and this is a manipulation where the taking up is unimportant; it is very improbable that the whole action got its name from an accessory moment. As the inspiration of the Pythia was supposed to come from the chasm in the adyton, where the holy fountain ran, the fact that the god lifts the oracle up from the depth seems adequately expressed by the word ἀναιρεῖν, and nowadays, I suppose, it is no objection to this explanation that the thing he takes up is not touchable, though this would have been enough for Lobeck to challenge it passionately.

SAUL WHO ALSO IS CALLED PAUL

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From the time of Origen and of Rufinus and St. Jerome [1] the question of the apparent change of the apostle's name from *Saul* to *Paul* has interested students of the New Testament. The problem is due to the fact that the author of the Acts in briefly giving an account of Paul's meeting with the Roman governor of Cyprus, Sergius Paullus, and with the false prophet Elymas, simply states: [2] "Then Saul (who also is called Paul) filled with the Holy Ghost, set his eyes on him, etc." Before this verse in Acts the apostle's name is invariably given as *Saul*, and after this verse he is always called *Paul*, except in two passages where there is reference to the very beginning of his career, his conversion.[3] In his letters the name *Paul*, and never *Saul*, is used.

From this statement of facts several related questions arise. Was Saul's name then changed to *Paul*? Was the name *Paul* added to the name *Saul*? Was any alteration at all then made? What part or element of the man's complete name was *Paul*? And what element was *Saul*? Able modern scholars have expressed entirely divergent views. Another attempt at a solution may seem foolhardy, but may be justified by the use of new evidence on the text of Acts, on the history of Paul's first missionary journey, and on further study of the forms of names of provincials who became Roman citizens.

Paul was a Roman citizen, born a Roman, according to evidence in the Acts.[4] A citizen in the reign of Augustus, when Paul was born, regularly had the *tria nomina*, *praenomen* (given name), *nomen* (name of *gens* denoting ultimate founder of the family and usually ending in *-ius*), *cognomen* (family name); for

[1] Origen in the translation of Rufinus given in Migne, P. G. XIV, 836. St. Jerome, De Viris Illustribus V.

[2] Acts XIII, 9.

[3] Acts XXII, 7 and 13; XXVI, 14. Cf. Acts IX, 4 and 17.

[4] Acts XXII, 25–29; XVI, 37. The author of Acts represents Paul as making the claim. Cf. Acts XXIII, 27.

example, *M. Tullius Cicero.*[5] But Paul was also a Hebrew.[6] Therefore his father, or some more distant male ascendant, must have been made Roman either by the grant of freedom, if he were a slave, or by naturalization, if he were a free provincial or foreigner. A slave, when given freedom, would legally and regularly assume the *praenomen* and *nomen* of his master and would add his slave name as his *cognomen*,[7] for example Cicero's freedman *M. Tullius Tiro.* Quite similarly a free foreigner, when granted Roman citizenship, would take the *praenomen* and *nomen* of the Roman who proposed him for the grant, or of the emperor who made the grant, and would retain his native name as his *cognomen.*[8] Such a procedure must have been followed by Paul's ancestor, if he were a free provincial. A son, especially the oldest son, might retain the *tria nomina* of his father — he would retain the *nomen* — but might be given a different *praenomen* and *cognomen.* A native *cognomen* was very often dropped for a son in favor of a regular Roman *cognomen* of Latin or Italian origin.[9]

[5] By the *Lex Iulia Municipalis,* put in force by Julius Caesar as dictator in 45 B.C., citizens living in *municipia, coloniae* and *praefecturae* of Italy were to be listed in the census by the *tria nomina, praenomen, nomen,* and *cognomen.* See C. G. Bruns, Fontes Iuris Romani Antiqui, Tübingen, 1909 (7th ed.), no. 18, paragraphs 142–148. Cf. no. 10, of 112 B.C., paragraphs 14 and 17. This law shows clearly the form established long before the birth of Paul, and it continued long after. There are some exceptions, or apparent exceptions, known as late as the reign of Augustus. For example the famous historian Livy is known only as T. Livius. Of course by custom, and for convenience, in all forms of Roman literary works a man may be called by only one or two of his *tria nomina.*

[6] Acts XXI, 37–XXII, 3; XXIII, 6. Philippians III, 1–6. Galatians I, 13–14.

[7] A. M. Duff, Freedmen in the Early Roman Empire, Oxford, 1928, pp. 50–55.

[8] Marquardt-Mommsen, Manuel des Antiquités Romaines XIV, I (La Vie Privée des Romains), Paris, 1892, p. 30 ff. Pauly-Wissowa, Supplement I (1903), s.v. *civitas* (by Kornemann), cols. 305 and 313. Cagnat, Cours d'Épigraphie Latine, Paris, 1914, pp. 77–80. An excellent illustration is given by H. Dessau, Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae I (1892), no. 1977, of a man C. Iulius Vepo who had been given citizenship by the emperor Augustus. The "C. Iulius" was taken from Augustus' personal name as the adopted son of Julius Caesar. Cicero gives an instance illustrating the taking of a Roman name and something of the legal procedure. In Epistulae ad Familiares XIII, 36, he tells that at his request P. Cornelius Dolabella had obtained citizenship from Caesar, when dictator, for a Greek of Sicily named Demetrius Megas. As then a Roman citizen Megas took for his *praenomen* and *nomen* P. Cornelius, from Dolabella, and retained *Megas* as his *cognomen.* These illustrations are of the time of Paul and his immediate ancestors.

[9] Tenney Frank, Race Mixture in the Roman Empire, a study in the American His-

To these matters of custom and of law concerning the *tria nomina* of Roman citizens of foreign birth one other element of nomenclature must be added in an approach to the explanation of St. Paul's name. In the Greek East, possibly beginning in Macedonian Egypt, and later, certainly by the second century after Christ, spreading even to the West of the Roman Empire, it became customary among numbers of provincials and Roman citizens to add informally another name, a name by which a person was called among his acquaintances. This name, termed *signum* and *supernomen* among the Romans, was doubtless often given at birth, but might have been assumed later.[10] It appears in large numbers of inscriptions and is connected normally with one or more of the other parts of a man's name by the expression ὁ καὶ, in Latin *qui et*. Sometimes connecting expressions such as ὁ ἐπικαλούμενος, ὁ λεγόμενος and others were used.

Now the text of the passage essential for an understanding of

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torical Review XXI (1915/1916), pp. 689–708. Frank, in an examination of some 13,900 inscriptions of the common people of the city of Rome, found 1,347 in which the names of a father and son both appeared. From these he showed that of all *cognomina* found the Greek diminished in one generation from 64% to 38%. The fathers were "very prone to give Latin names to their children." See also A. M. Duff (p. 57), who has, however, misinterpreted Frank's calculations as referring only to freedmen. Caesar, Gallic War I, 47, gives an excellent example in a reference to a C. Valerius Procillus, son of C. Valerius Caburus who had been made a Roman citizen by C. Valerius Flaccus, Roman governor of Gaul. Cicero, Pro Archia X, 24, states that Pompey gave Roman citizenship to Theophanes of Mytilene, a writer of history. This man then took the name Cn. Pompeius Theophanes (Inscriptiones Graecae ad Res Romanas Pertinentes IV, 56); but his son was Pompeius Macer. See Prosopographia Imperii Romani vol. III, 67, 471. Another example, possibly from Paul's lifetime, comes in inscriptional form from Cyprus: the father is C. Ummidius Pantauchus, who may have received citizenship through a governor of Cyprus, C. Ummidius Quadratus. Pantauchus' son is named C. Ummidius Quadratus qui et Pantauchus. The inscription is in Greek. (I. G. R. III, 950; Prosopographia III (1st ed.), 468, 600.)

[10] M. Lambertz, Zur Doppelnamigkeit in Ägypten, Jahresbericht über das K. K. Elizabeth-Gymnasium in Wien XXVI (1911). M. Lambertz, Zur Ausbreitung des Supernomen oder Signum im römischen Reiche, in Glotta IV (1913), pp. 78–143, and V (1914), pp. 99–170. This is by far the most important study of the use of ὁ καὶ and *qui et*. Bruno Doer, Die römische Namengebung, Stuttgart, 1937, and especially pp. 179–201. This is a useful study, but marred by the omission of any account of the names of Jewish Romans. Hélène Wuilleumier, Étude Historique sur l'Emploi et la Signification des Signa, in Mémoires à l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres XIII (1933), pp. 559–696, while giving a splendidly analyzed listing of *signa*, has nothing to add for this study.

Paul's name, in Acts XIII, 9, shows: Σαῦλος δέ, ὁ καὶ Παῦλος. This reading is obviously an instance of the giving of the *signum* or *supernomen*. Jerome in translating the ὁ καὶ by the regular *qui et* evidently recognizes the almost technical nature of the expression. This most regular of the connecting expressions appears only here in the New Testament; but in references to other persons a few passages use the participial connectives for the same purpose.[11]

It appears then certain that either *Saul* or *Paul* is the *signum* of the apostle, and since he was a Roman citizen, one of the names should be a part of his *tria nomina*. There is general agreement today that the name *Saul* is the same as that of Israel's first king, and the name *Paul* is Roman, belonging especially to the great Aemilian *gens*, one of whose members, L. Aemilius Paullus brought Macedonia under Roman sway.[12]

[11] Acts XIII, 1; Συμεὼν ὁ καλούμενος Νίγερ. Acts XII, 12: Ἰωάννου τοῦ ἐπικαλουμένου Μάρκου. See on the same man Acts XII, 25 and XV, 37 for essentially the same expression. Acts I, 23: Ἰωσὴφ τὸν καλούμενον Βαρσαββᾶν, ὃς ἐπεκλήθη Ἰοῦστος, Acts IV, 36: Ἰωσὴφ δὲ ὁ ἐπικληθεὶς Βαρνάβας ἀπὸ τῶν ἀποστόλων. Col. IV, 11: Ἰησοῦς ὁ λεγόμενος Ἰοῦστος. It is rather interesting to note that Christ himself is said to have given a "surname," *Boanerges*, to James and John (Mark III, 17), and of course, *Cephas* translated *Peter*, to Simon (John I, 42; Mark III, 16). The writer of Acts is particularly interested in recording the *signa* in the case of "John Mark" three separate times. It may be of some significance that, when a Roman (Latin) name is given with another, it always appears last. There are four individuals so designated. But it is not here my purpose to assert or to deny that they were Roman citizens. M. Lambertz, Glotta V (1914), p. 159, has shown from inscriptions that provincials in Syria and Asia Minor often took on a Latin name. He also proves that very often the *cognomen* and the *signum* have a similarity in sound, sometimes close, sometimes not. This custom may help as an indication that *Saul* and *Paul* are those two elements of the name, whatever the identity of each may be. But as the Greek form for *Paul* is Παῦλος, while for *Saul* it may have been Σαούλ (about which evidence will be presented), the point can not be emphasized. It can have no bearing at any rate on the problem of the time of the assumption of either name.

[12] See the excellent, though brief, presentation of various views in K. Lake and Henry J. Cadbury, The Beginnings of Christianity, vol. IV (1933), pp. 145–146. There it is pointed out that "Augustine, using the meaning of the name, thinks that it is a reference to Paul's modesty, 'I am the least of the apostles' (Augustine, De Spirit. et litt. XII, Serm. cclxxix. 5, cccxv. 5)." But Ausgutine's view assumes that Paul adopted the name *Paulus* himself, and that he was so well acquainted with Latin that he chose for himself a Latin adjective as a name, instead of some Greek term. Very unlikely. (See A. T. Robertson, A Grammar of the Greek New Testament, New York, 1919 (3rd ed.), pp. 109 and 263.) Lake and Cadbury (loc. cit.) also point out that a German scholar in 1882 suggested that the name *Paul* came from a Hebrew root

It is here important to stress the conclusion of M. Lambertz in his thoroughgoing study on *signa* that the position of a name before or after ὁ καὶ does not fix its identity. The *signum* is found in either position.[13] Of course when a Roman's name is given first in the full formal *tria nomina* and another name is added following ὁ καὶ, the added name is regularly the *signum*, but here that is not the situation.

Whatever part of the apostle's name *Saul* is, it is clear from the Acts that he had the name *Saul* from his early years.[14] But when did he get the name *Paul*? The answer to this question will be of decisive importance. Diametrically opposed views have been and are held by eminent scholars. Some assert that Paul took the name, after his interesting experience in Cyprus with the Roman governor Sergius Paullus, to honor the governor or because he had converted him.[15] Others, that he had the name *Paul* already and that after the visit to Cyprus he began to use it regularly, perhaps from association with the governor, and perhaps because he now began to carry the Gos-

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meaning "chosen." This view has not won acceptance. That the name *Paullus* and the adjective *paullus* are one and the same word is doubtless true; but the word as a name in both Greek and Latin form had been known to the Roman world for centuries before Paul's time and was still in use in great senatorial families, as the name of the governor of Cyprus witnesses, and other illustrations are readily found of the use of the name in the Greek East. (See Prosopographia III, 1st ed., pp. 17–18, and I. G. R. IV, p. 626.) It seems certain then that it is the *name Paullus* with which we have to do. The varied spelling of the name is of no significance. In the Latin the name is spelled both *Paullus* (the correct form) and *Paulus*. In the Greek of the New Testament the form Παῦλος is used, and this form appears in inscriptions as well as Παῦλλος. (See the references immediately above.)

[13] M. Lambertz in Glotta IV (1913), pp. 133 and 140; cf. pp. 130 and 131.

[14] Acts VII, 58 and 60, at the stoning of Stephen, is the earliest mention. The reason that the apostle's father gave him the name *Saul* is probably to be found in the fact that the king and the apostle were both of the tribe of Benjamin. (Acts XIII, 21; Romans XI, 1; Philippians III, 5; I Samuel IX, 1–2 and 21.) H. J. Leon, The Names of the Jews of Ancient Rome, in Transactions of the American Philological Association LIX (1928), pp. 205–224, shows *inter alia* the use of Semitic *signa* at Rome by Jews.

[15] In general see Lake and Cadbury, op. cit.; Eduard Meyer, Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums, Berlin, vol. III (1923), pp. 196–197; H. Dessau, Der Name des Apostels Paulus, in Hermes XLV (1910), pp. 347–368; P. Andrien Boudou, S. J., Verbum Salutis VII — Actes des Apôtres, Paris, 1933, pp. 275–276; K. Lake and Silva Lake, An Introduction to the New Testament, New York, 1937, pp. 83–84; Ernst Renan, Saint Paul, Paris, 1869, p. 18.

pel to the Gentiles.[16] These and other related explanations must be evaluated.

But first a new factor should be introduced, one of great importance, and only very recently available to scholars. It has long been observed that in the Greek text of Acts the Greek adaptation Σαῦλος, very like Παῦλος, is invariably used except in the "vocatives," those passages where the voice from Heaven is heard, and where Ananias addresses the apostle. There the indeclinable form is Σαούλ, which is also used for King Saul in the Acts, and is doubtless derived from the Septuagint, where first this Greek approximation to the Hebrew name is to be found.[17] However, in the Beatty Papyri, the earliest text of Acts by a century or so, and dating possibly not over 200 years from the apostle's lifetime, the Greek form Σαῦλος does not appear at all, but only the form Σαούλ, and fortunately several separate passages which contain it are preserved.[18] This form not only

[16] Sir William M. Ramsay, St. Paul the Traveller, New York, 1896, pp. 81–88; Adolf Deissmann, Paul, translated by William E. Wilson, Hadder and Stoughton, London, 1926 (2nd ed.), p. 91; Adolf Deissmann, Bibelstudien, Marburg, 1895, pp. 181–186; F. J. Foakes-Jackson, The Acts of the Apostles, in the Moffat New Testament Commentary, Richard R. Smith, New York, 1931; August Holland, Saint Paul, Paris, 1934, p. 35; J. Alec Findlay, The Acts of the Apostles, A Commentary, London, 1934, p. 132; F. A. Spencer, Beyond Damascus, Fr. Muller, London, 1935, pp. 171–174; C. T. Wood, The Life, Letters, and Religion of St. Paul, T. and T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1925, p. 50.

[17] For Σαῦλος in the narrative passages, see Acts VII, 58 and 60 (VIII, 1); VIII, 3; IX, 11, 22, 24, and 26; XI, 25 and 30; XIII, 1, 2, 7, and 9. For the "vocatives," Σαούλ see Acts IX, 4 and 17; XXII, 7 and 13; XXVI, 14. The last reference describes the voice from Heaven as "in the Hebrew tongue." The Septuagint (e.g. Kings I, 9 and passim) gives Σαούλ for the king, and this is used also of the king in Acts XIII, 21.

[18] F. G. Kenyon, The Chester Beatty Biblical Papyri, Fasciculus II, The Gospels and the Acts, London, Emory Walker Limited, 1933; and the accompanying volume of Plates, 1934. For the form Σαούλ, indeclinable, see Acts VII, 58 (genitive case); IX, 24 (dative); XI, 30 (genitive); XIII, 7 (accusative). Kenyon gives all these as certain in his text. The Facsimiles are none too clear on XI, 30 and IX, 24, though in the latter the spelling with the three vowels Σαου is sure, and the λ may be. The scribe regularly writes an apostrophe after the last letter Σαούλ', indicating his awareness of the fact that he is giving a non-Greek indeclinable name, exactly as he does, for example, in the case of the names *Joseph*, *Abraham*, and *Jerusalem* (Acts VII, 13, 14, and 18; XIII, 26 and 27). This usage of the apostrophe for Hebrew names is found of course in other early manuscripts, though not in the case of the name *Saul*. It means that a regular Greek termination is not used, and does not mean that the scribe is omitting an ending. For the use of the apostrophe in other manuscripts see W. H. P. Hatch, The Principal Uncial Manuscripts of the New Testament, Chicago, The

lacks a Greek termination, but includes an extra vowel, *omicron*, not found in the "Greek" spelling. Now if the Greek scribe of the Beatty text of the Acts had the developed Greek form Σαῦλος before him in the manuscript from which he was copying, it seems very improbable that he would change to the Hebrew-like Σαούλ. In all probability he had Σαούλ before him. This reasoning suggests that the form Σαούλ was actually the name of the apostle.

A suggestion for the history of the development of the spelling is here appropriate. The translators of the Septuagint introduced the form Σαούλ, as has been stated, for the name of King Saul. The writer of the Acts accepted this form too for the king, and accepted it not only in the "vocatives" for the apostle, but as the Beatty Papyri indicate, throughout. Interesting is the use of Josephus, whose works were written at about the same time as the Acts. He, and the Greek scholars who assisted him, tend to give Greek endings to Hebrew names. So the name *Saul* appears as Σάουλος the form of the Septuagint plus a Greek ending.[19] Clement,[20] about 100 A.D., still keeps the spelling Σαούλ for the king's name. The Beatty Papyri, a century and over later, preserve the form. The other later manuscripts of the New Testament give for the apostle, not for the king, Σαῦλος, a form not in the Septuagint nor in Josephus. It will be remembered that the spelling for *Paul* is invariably Παῦλος. It seems then extremely likely that at some time in the third or fourth century, under the influence of analogy, the form Σαῦλος was created to match Παῦλος. But even after this change in spelling of the apostle's name *Saul* in the Greek New Testament the distinction was being kept there and elsewhere between the spelling of the name of the king and

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University of Chicago Press, 1939; plates VI, XI, and XXI, from the third to fifth centuries.

[19] Josephus, Antiquities VI, 9, 170 ff. In the Jewish War II, 556 and 558, he uses the same form for an individual of the time of Nero; but in II, 418 the form Σαῦλος appears for the same man, probably by error in copying, cf. Ant. XX, 214. In Jewish War II, 469 another individual is called Σάουλος. In V, 51 (Loeb text) Γαβαὰθ Σαούλ is interpreted λόφον Σαούλου. The accentuation of the various forms seems pretty well established, but Naber (Teubner, 1895), Jewish War II, 556 and 558, gives Σαοῦλος.

[20] Clement, To the Corinthians I, cap. IV, 13.

of the apostle. And Jerome, in his Latin New Testament, gives *Saul* for the king, but for the apostle, uses *Saulus*, and in the vocative, *Saule*.[21]

If this is so, if the Beatty Papyri present the correct form for the name *Saul*, then the name may be identified as the *signum* of the apostle and not as one of his Roman *tria nomina*. The *tria nomina* are forms which can be regularly declined with regular case endings,[22] while Σαούλ has none. Σαούλ would never do as a Roman name, but as a native name given as a *signum* to a Roman citizen it will do very well indeed. That is a common practice, as Lambertz' study shows in countless places, while it is true that in most instances the foreign names have taken on Greek or Latin endings.[23] Παῦλος is then not the *signum*, but is one of the *tria nomina*, in all probability the *cognomen*, as that

[21] In two inscriptions found in Christian churches of Gerasa, very late it is true, but possibly not under literary influence, the spelling Σαώλας has been lately found, probably representing *Saul*. See Carl H. Kraeling, Gerasa, City of the Decapolis, New Haven, 1938, p. 479, no. 304, and p. 487, no. 335, dated in 526 and in 511. See also A. H. M. Jones, Inscriptions from Jerash, Journal of Roman Studies XVIII (1928), p. 168, no. 35. In the two inscriptions the name appears in the same case, the genitive, Σαώλα, of which the nominative is probably Σαώλας. Tertullian, around 200 A.D., uses in Latin, for the name of the king, *Saul*, but definitely puts it in the third declension. See Adversus Marcionem II, 23 and 24; V, 1. Cyprian, about 50 years later, in Epistulae XIII, II, 2, gives a nominative *Saul*. The Old Testament (Vulgate) appears to use both the indeclined form and the third declensional form, as readily appears from a reading of I Kings IX. It may then be possible that Tertullian established for Latin the third declensional form of *Saul*. But in the Old Latin version of the Acts (Palimpsest Floriacensis) the second declensional form clearly appears, *Saulus* and *Saule*, for the apostle. See Old Latin Biblical Texts: No. V, ed. by E. S. Buchanan, Oxford, 1907, p. 114, text of Acts VII, 58–60 and IX, 4. Jerome then is evidently following the Old Latin in this, and he uses the second declensional form also in De Viris Illustribus V, for the apostle; but in Chronicon, adapted from Eusebius, he has the nominative *Saul*, for the king. See Rudolf Helm's edition, Die Chronik des Hieronymus, Leipsig, 1913, p. 65. And in his Letters Jerome seems to use both the indeclined and the third declensional form for the name of the king, while keeping the second declensional form for the apostle. See Epistulae XXIX, 3, 2 and 7; 6, 2; LIII, 8, 5; CXXI, 6, 16; also In Hieremiam VI, 34. Augustine shows the same differentiation. See Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, vol. LVIII (1923), pp. 281 and 315, ed. Al. Goldbacher. This differentiation in the Latin may be an added proof of the contention that the Greek spelling Σαῦλος comes by analogy from Παῦλος.

[22] See for example L. R. Dean, A Study of the Cognomina of Soldiers in the Roman Legions, Princeton, 1916. Dean lists some 1,333 different *cognomina* and some 5,700 persons, all Roman citizens. Incidentally the name *Saul* does not appear among them.

[23] Lambertz, op. cit. (1914), pp. 113, 114, 165 and passim.

is its normal Roman use, but barely possibly the *praenomen*,[24] or given name. This result carries with it inevitably the conclusion that the name *Paul* was then the apostle's from youth, either given him by his parents, or, as a *cognomen*, possibly an inheritance from his father, who was also a Roman citizen.

The arguments of scholars who have agreed that the name *Paul* was the apostle's before the episode in Cyprus must now be briefly stated. Deissmann insists that the statement of the name in Acts XIII, 9, Σαῦλος δέ, ὁ καὶ Παῦλος, does not mean that the apostle then changed his name, but only that he changed from his former use of *Saul* to his future use of *Paul*. Sir William Ramsay points out that it was a custom in the bilingual sections of the Greek East for every Easterner to bear also a Greek name, and that the situation of the moment might determine which name a man would use. This will apply, he thinks, to *Saul-Paul*. In earlier days among the Jews he preferred *Saul*; now before the Roman governor of Cyprus he stresses *Paul* showing his own Roman standing. Foakes-Jackson states that it is not probable that Luke intends us to believe that the apostle dropped his Hebrew for a Roman appellation. The purpose of the change in the name by which the apostle is called is to prepare the reader for the work of the apostle among the Gentiles. Lake and Cadbury point out that the passage may mark a "Paul" source, that is, documentary material available to Luke, which used the name *Paul*, while his materials for the earlier part of Acts used *Saul*; that there is here marked a coincidence of name with that of the proconsul; that for the first time the writer was dealing with Gentile surroundings. J. Alec Findlay is in essential agreement with the review of opinions stated by Foakes-Jackson, and adds: "It is difficult to believe that Paul was snobbish enough to take his new name from his first distinguished convert!" [25]

[24] As a *cognomen* the form is known for centuries. As a *praenomen* it was given in Augustus' time to Paullus Fabius Maximus, whose family, related to the Aemilian Paullus family, evidently wanted to keep the great name, and so made a *praenomen* from a *cognomen*. The same may be said of Paullus Aemilius Lepidus. Both these men were consuls, and were proconsuls of the province of Asia — hence known to some extent in the Greek East. See Prosopographia I (1st ed.), 32, 250 and II, 48, 38.

[25] See note 16, above, for the references.

On the other hand H. Dessau's scholarly study brought him to the conclusion that the apostle took his name *Paul* from the governor of Cyprus, Sergius Paullus. Dessau's arguments, though now to a degree antiquated by later evidence, are still more important to the question than any others, and they are championed, though not strengthened, by Eduard Meyer,[26] and have been supplemented by E. Groag.[27]

Dessau begins with a brief discussion of the views of ancient scholars which are worth repeating. Jerome [28] took the position in more than one work that *Saul* assumed the name *Paul* because of his victory over Sergius Paullus, that is his conversion of the governor, as Scipio took the name *Africanus*. The answer to this position is that there is no proof of it, that the parallel with Scipio and others is not valid, that the taking over of a man's name in any such way is unheard of. Rufinus, a contemporary of Jerome, possibly reproducing Origen, does not deny the view of Jerome entirely, but on the basis of popular precedent thinks that the apostle had these two names before the episode in Cyprus.

Dessau thinks it strange that it should have occurred to Paul's parents, living so far in the East, to give him a Latin name. But when one considers that they lived in Tarsus, a busy metropolis of a Roman province often visited by prominent Romans after the middle of the first century B.C., e.g. Cicero, Caesar, Mark Antony,[29] that they were themselves Roman citizens and that several Jewish associates of Paul had Roman names,[30] to say nothing of the fact that *Paullus* was a Roman name already widely known in the Roman Empire in both Greek and Latin form, and that, as we have shown, Romanized foreigners very often gave their sons Roman names, Dessau's objection has little weight. Dessau again states that the assumption of the name *Paul* was really a change of *cognomen*, and that this is not unheard of even though not common. It is in fact extremely uncommon. Moreover, if the name

[26] See note 15, above, for the studies of Dessau and Meyer.

[27] Pauly-Wissowa, Real Encyclopädie II. A. (1923), col. 1716, s.v. Sergius Paullus.

[28] Dessau, op. cit., p. 349. Lake and Cadbury, p. 145.

[29] Ruge in Pauly-Wissowa IV (1932), col. 2413 ff., s.v. Tarsos.

[30] Dessau, p. 366/7. See also above, note 11.

Paul was assumed in Cyprus, it would be more in accordance with the custom in the Greek East to consider it an added name, a *signum*. Dessau's study here suffers from a lack of information which Lambertz' later work would have given him. The ὁ καὶ connecting the *Saul* and *Paul* surely has been shown by this study to be a practical proof of the association of the *signum* with part of the formal *tria nomina*. Dessau thinks that the apostle, now in Cyprus, engaged in his first great missionary journey, with the possible thought of continuing on into Pamphylia and Pisidia on the mainland, felt the need of a name familiar to Greeks and Romans and took that of the governor with whom he had had an interesting and successful meeting. Finally Dessau finds it a very strange coincidence, if the apostle happened to be the possessor of the very same *cognomen* that the proconsul had.

It is indeed a strange coincidence which demands explanation. Why does Luke in the account of the meeting with the governor first call the apostle *Paul*, the only name by which he is known in Acts and Epistles alike thereafter? The governor is a well authenticated person. His name in the form Σεργίῳ Παύλῳ is supported by all the great manuscripts and, fortunately, is preserved also in the Beatty Papyri.[31] In Latin he is known by official inscriptional evidence as L. Sergius Paullus, of the senatorial order.[32] His position in Cyprus shows that he was probably an ex-praetor, a man of the same class and rank as

[31] F. G. Kenyon, op. cit., p. 45. To Tertullian also he is known, undoubtedly from the passage in Acts, in his De Idololatria, cap. IX. This passage is an early and additional support for the form of the proconsul's name.

[32] C. I. L. VI, 31545. See also the admirable presentation by Kirsopp Lake in F. J. Foakes-Jackson and Kirsopp Lake, The Beginnings of Christianity, Part I, The Acts of the Apostles, Vol. V, Additional Notes to the Commentary, London, 1933, pp. 455–459. With their statement on the uncertainty of the reference to the governor Paullus in a Greek inscription of Cyprus, I would agree. But I would rather strongly insist on the identification of Sergius Paullus of Cyprus with L. Sergius Paullus of the Latin inscription from Rome. This man by his position was probably an ex-praetor, and he certainly was serving as *curator* at Rome in the rule of Claudius. This fits perfectly with the known chronology of the governor of Cyprus. I would add that the Roman Senate of the period consisted of only some 600 men. (O'Brien Moore in Pauly-Wissowa Supplementband VI (1935), cols. 760–761.) In no one generation are we at all likely to find two senators of the same name and of approximately the same position. Moreover, the name *Sergius Paullus* is very rare. The case for identity is then very strong.

Gallio of Achaia, whom Paul was to meet some years later. From a practical point of view the favorable impression which the apostle made on a man of such high rank could be very useful, and Paul may well have taken great satisfaction from this meeting. Nothing of the later career of Sergius Paullus is known; but it is known that the family probably, or, at any rate, Paullus' son and daughter and descendants had a home in or had close connections with the important Roman colony, Antioch in Pisidia,[33] the very place to which Paul went almost directly after leaving Cyprus.[34]

Here is another coincidence in the lives of the apostle and the governor, and one which has not received the attention it deserves except in Groag's study.[35] He alone has suggested that the favorable attitude of the governor may have resulted in advice and assistance to Paul and a suggestion about the city of Antioch. In support of this is another item of the itinerary — Paul met the governor in the city of Paphos and from that city he and his companions sailed to the mainland, though there were other ports and though they had not yet very

[33] The inscriptional evidence is excellent. Lake (see above, note 32) has paid little attention to it, and seems not to know of Groag's studies in Pauly-Wissowa II, A (1923), cols. 1715–1721, nos. 34, 35, and 52. See also for inscriptions the study by G. L. Cheesman, The Family of the Caristanii at Antioch in Pisidia, Journal of Roman Studies III (1913), pp. 253–266. Also Sir William Ramsay, The Bearing of Recent Discoveries on the Trustworthiness of the New Testament, ed. 4, London, 1920, p. 150 ff.; p. 285 ff. I agree with Lake in not accepting all Ramsay's interpretations and especially his idea that the whole Paullus family became Christians.

First there is known at Antioch Sergia Paulla, daughter of Lucius, and wife of C. Caristanius Fronto, governor of Lycia and Pamphylia under Titus and then Domitian, that is, about 81 A.D. This woman on the basis of her name, her father's name, her rank, the time, was in all probability daughter of Sergius Paullus of Cyprus. Then in another inscription of Antioch we are given by Ramsay (The Bearing etc. p. 151) the name of a senator, L. Sergius L. f. Paullus filius etc. The inscription, not dated but of lettering "of about 60–100 A.D." is doubtless of the son, or grandson of the governor of Cyprus. Again the same inscription which gives information about Paulla gives the name C. Caristanius Paulinus, her son, whose name indicates the union of the Sergian and Caristanian families. See Prosopographia II (2nd ed.), 1936, pp. 100–101 on all these persons.

[34] Acts XIII, 12–14. On Antioch and Paul's route see Jean Bérard, Les Itinéraires de Saint Paul in Asie Mineure, in Revue Archéologique V (1935), pp. 60–70.

[35] See note 33. Groag also, like Dessau, wants to associate this situation with the assumption of the name *Paul* by the apostle, but with no other proof.

thoroughly covered Cyprus in their tour.[36] This suggestion has not been made before; but Ramsay [37] suggested some years ago that the trip from Perge, after the voyage from Cyprus, to Antioch was due to an illness of Paul, possibly malaria, brought on by the unhealthy conditions of the coastal region. That Paul was ill at Antioch, or in that region, may be true; but it is not necessary to conclude that he went to Antioch because of illness. The passage, Galatians IV, 13, if it may be applied to this "first" journey, may simply mean that he remained at Antioch, or some one of the Galatian cities, from illness.[38] Nothing of this illness is in the Acts. Moreover, there is a passage in Acts XV, 38 which certainly states that Paul and Barnabas then went from Pamphylia to Antioch "to the work." That there had been a change of plan for the tour made at Paphos or at Perge seems clear from the fact that after they reached the mainland John Mark left them, very much against Paul's wishes,[39] and returned to Jerusalem. Ramsay [40] suggests that Mark was unwilling to go so far inland when Paul was forced to do so by his illness. An explanation equally logical, and much

[36] Strabo, Geography XIV, 6. A reading of this passage with the account in Acts XIII, 4 ff. and the map of Cyprus shows the evidence. Foakes-Jackson and Lake, op. cit., p. 224, state: "Probably one reason for going to Antioch was its large Jewish colony." This may well have been a factor, as Acts XIII tells of a Jewish synagogue there. Lake's reference, however, to Josephus apparently has to do with Antioch in Syria.

[37] Sir William M. Ramsay, The Church in the Roman Empire, Putnam's, New York, 1893, pp. 59–66.

[38] The place of his illness was not necessarily Antioch at all. The letter which contains the passage is addressed to the Galatians, city not specified. δι' ἀσθένειαν . . . in all probability means "owing to infirmity of the flesh," and not "in a time of illness." See Frederic Rendall on the passage in the Expositors Greek Testament, ed. by W. R. Nicoll, New York, vol. III (1903), p. 178. See also C. T. Wood, The Life, Letters and Religion of St. Paul, Edinburgh, 1925, p. 51. If the reference in Galatians IV, 13 should be applied to another later trip, then Ramsay's entire explanation would not belong here and would be pointless. On the chronological question involved, see A. D. Nock, St. Paul, New York, 1938, pp. 119 and 161.

[39] Acts XIII, 13; XV, 36–39. The passages state that Paul, long after the event, was so angry at Mark's desertion that he and Barnabas quarreled, and after that were no longer associated in the missionary work. Emphasis on the importance of the work at Antioch seems also to be given by Luke in placing the locale of Paul's first long sermon in that city, and in assigning to that episode also the apostles' expressed intention, "we turn to the Gentiles." See Acts XIII, 14–48.

[40] Cf. note 37.

more to John Mark's credit, is at hand if the suggestion that the plan to go to Antioch was made at Paphos is accepted. Then John Mark may have decided during the voyage from Cyprus that he would not go further, or he may have been permitted to make the voyage with them to the mainland which then would enable him to go to Jerusalem on foot.

If these explanations seem valid, the fact that the mention of the name *Paul* first occurs in the episode concerning Sergius Paullus is to be explained on the very coincidence of the names, and in the plan made to carry the gospel far into Asia Minor, entirely new territory. The apostle assumes now (the author of Acts seems to say) the regular use of his regular *cognomen Paul* because of the association with the governor and possibly because of the increasingly frequent contact with Greeks and Romans, which he saw must be ahead of him.[41]

But it could, of course, be supposed — and eminent scholars have asserted it — that the name *Paul* may have been first taken by the apostle in Cyprus, in which case *Paul* would be the *signum*, according to the custom of the Greek East, and *Saul* would be his Roman *cognomen* from birth. This conclusion, however, involves the assumption that the Hebraic Σαούλ had already been given a Greek form Σάουλος, as in Josephus long after the apostle's birth, or Σαῦλος, the form appearing in most New Testament manuscripts.[42] This conclusion further involves the assumption that the Beatty Papyri text is incorrect for the name, and of course is a denial of the proof advanced above that the spelling Σαῦλος comes by analogy from

[41] Behind these suggestions lies obviously an assumption of the essential historicity of the episodes on this topic given in the Acts about Paul. In this position this study differs little, when at all, from the works cited on either side of the main question here at issue. If, however, the use of the name *Saul* up to the episode in Cyprus and the use of the name *Paul* thereafter should prove to be only a device of narrative on the part of the author of Acts, one might readily conclude that the meeting with the governor Paullus made a great impression on the writer, with nothing known of its impression on Paul. If one advance to a denial or serious question of the historicity of the narrative in Acts on Paul's name, it could appear that we know one thing alone in this matter, namely that the apostle calls himself *Paul* in his Letters. The evidence of this paper as to how and why a Jewish Roman could very properly have a Roman, Latin *cognomen* and a Jewish *signum* would still stand. I am indebted to Prof. A. D. Nock, of Harvard, for the suggestion of caution set forth in this note.

[42] Roman citizens' names are regularly declinable. See above, and note 22.

Παῦλος. It also necessarily means that a grown Roman citizen took on as *signum* the name of another Roman citizen, for which one knows no precedent. Finally, it denies the custom which so often led Romanized foreigners to give their sons full Roman names.

We may claim then at least probability in favor of a view that the apostle was named *Paul* from birth, with *Saul* as his *signum*. Progress in the solution of the problem seems difficult unless by good luck still other papyri of the Acts are found or other inscriptions concerning the governor Paullus. We do not know Paul's *praenomen* or *nomen*. Perhaps they may have come from the great Aemilian family as well as the *cognomen*. In such case his Roman name might have read Λ. Αἰμίλιος Παῦλος ὁ καὶ Σαούλ or in Latin dress, L. Aemilius Paullus qui et Saul.

THE CONTRIBUTION OF *EXISTENZ-PHILOSOPHIE*

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THE purpose of this paper is to offer a brief description of *Existenz-philosophie* as it appears in the work of three men — Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Jaspers — and to make a few critical comments. One special obstacle should be noted at the start. A summary always misses the particular shades of meaning which an author brings out as he develops his theme in his own words, and in this philosophy it is the special *nuances* which are particularly important. *Existenz* is in fact as much like poetry as it is like philosophy, and a large part of its flavor is lost when it is translated into plodding prose. It makes less, that is to say, of the appeal to objective, verifiable truth than of subjective experience in its individual aspect. So far as it makes use of universal, communicable forms these are aesthetic rather than intellectual, and resemble more nearly the imaginative projections of a Schopenhauer or a Nietzsche than the logical essences of, say, a Plato. This appears to be true even in Heidegger's case in spite of the fact that he inherited from his master, Husserl, an interest in the bracketed, "reduced" logical essence which is reminiscent of the Platonic form. In Heidegger's hands *Phänomenologie* by becoming *Existenz* has turned from the logical to the more imaginative and emotional side of experience. *Existenz* is thus a poetic and philosophical attempt to describe the subjective experiences of religion, and as such it depends for much of its appeal on its own medium of expression.

In the urgency of his sense for the absolute and for its inescapable influence on human life Kierkegaard makes us think of Francis Thompson. Jaspers is like Browning in his originality, his profoundly moral quality and, it must be added, in his obscurity. On the basis of the arbitrary waywardness of his style Heidegger can only be compared to Gertrude Stein. Like her he uses strange words in an ordinary setting or ordinary words in strange settings to jolt us out of our complacently accepted cate-

gories. The first question we ask of *Existenz* may therefore well have to do with its status. Of many a modern picture we say: It is interesting, but is it art? and of *Existenz* we are tempted to ask: Can it be called philosophy? Whatever our answer, we should observe that many in Germany today expect it to act like philosophy and that they find in it the one philosophical hope for the future. Neo-Kantianism, they say, has played itself out and has lost its creative touch. *Phänomenologie* has introduced a new method, but now that the method has been applied to science, religion, and art, the first flush of enthusiasm for it has begun to wane. *Existenz* is admittedly a peculiar type of philosophy, but at present it holds more promise than any other type. With the collapse of the German university system, the disappearance of the classroom as a place for effective work, and the exclusion of almost all truly objective material from the journals, many believe that the task of philosophy must be carried on by the retired philosopher in his private study as he allows his inner experience to develop its own insights, perhaps with the aid of exchanges of letters as in the Leibnizian period. In such conditions only a subjective, imaginative type of thought can be expected to flourish.

Existenz is not a school but a name for certain similarities in the thought of otherwise diverse philosophers. It must be understood first of all as a movement of revolt which takes a direction not unlike that of Jamesian pragmatism. Kierkegaard rebelled against the same things in Hegel which antagonized James — his stilted academicism, his attempt to objectify what cannot be made objective, his indifference to private emotion and to the importance of actual human decisions. Yet Kierkegaard does not turn from *Geist* to the sheer dynamic drives of *Leben*, as James with his emphasis on the will often seems to do. *Existenz* for him is more like a combination of *Leben* and *Geist*, that is, an attempt to combine the passion and individuality of the one with the sensitive discrimination of the other. Furthermore, it attempts to combine the pessimistic sense of frustration and failure with the religious hope of a complete overcoming of evil, in a way which is far removed from the emphasis of pragmatism as a whole, even though in James as an individual both

pessimism and religious hope had their place. Indeed, *Existenz* does not fit easily into any of our ordinary classifications, partly because in spite of Kierkegaard's sharp disjunctions and his emphasis on "Either — Or" it includes so many features apparently antagonistic to one another. It is philosophy, yet it is more interested in doing justice to personal feeling than in following a rigorous logical procedure. It is poetry, yet it brings a moral challenge. It is religion, yet even in Kierkegaard's case it is scornful of the narrowness and exclusiveness of all theologies. The word which most nearly expresses its special qualities is the necessarily vague and inconclusive word "personal." *Existenz* is an attempt to put into words the essentially indescribable experience which we call personal life, with special reference to its sensitive, suffering, and decision-making moments.

The nineteenth century saw three great prophets of revolt — Nietzsche, Marx, and Kierkegaard. Nietzsche rebelled against impersonalism in politics, economics, and science on behalf of the individual, yet his actual influence in Germany has encouraged a philosophy of ruthless power. Marx revolted against social injustice, and although many evils have been eradicated in his name, it is still a question whether his followers, if they had their way today, would make us free from bondage to material things. Kierkegaard rebelled against conventionalism and intellectualism in religion. Does the new interest in him mean that he is actually to be numbered among the liberators of the human spirit, or shall we find that in effect he binds us the more inescapably to an obsolete formula?

Kierkegaard writes about paradoxes in his books and gives examples of them in his own procedure. Consider the fact that his commentators unanimously insist that we must go to his own experience if we are to understand what he wrote, and must take account of the curse which overshadowed his father's life, and of his own brooding melancholy and his broken engagement to Regine Olsen. Yet consider also that as an author he kept his own experience in the background. Thus whereas his thought, like that of Hosea, grew out of his personal life, his writing, like that of Second Isaiah, made use of anonymity, and we get the impression that he wished his work to be judged not personally

but objectively. Another paradox appears in the fact that he preached the helplessness and weakness of man yet was sure of his own genius and willing to wait for posterity's recognition of it. He insisted that each must come to God directly, without intermediary, yet in effect he set himself up as an intermediary, so confident was he in the completeness of his own vision. He has been called a religious poet, yet no Calvinistic preacher of damnation could have more deadly seriousness. He was a believer in human freedom, but based his belief on the omnipotence of God. He wrote on dread and fear and trembling, yet preached a gospel which he believed to be one of love. He relied on what he himself called the Absurd, yet wrote books in which he tried to explain it. So far as these seeming inconsistencies are capable of resolution it appears to be in the fact that Kierkegaard is concerned with life as a dialectical process in which opposites meet and fuse to part and meet again and that the special feature which requires notice is the restless interchange in the communication between God and man. God has a truth for man, but it is not what it seems. It must be accepted and put into life and inner experience, then projected and externalized, only to be absorbed once more. The truth is absolute, but our experience of it is inconclusive, and infected always with the restless and dynamic quality which attends all human experience.

What does the word *Existenz* mean for Kierkegaard? We must observe that it is a word arbitrarily chosen which has to be explained since it does not have the meaning that attaches to our English word "existence." Let us see first what it is not and compare it with other similar words in German where distinctions among types of existence are made more sharply than with us. It is not *Dasein*. A thing has *Dasein*, that is, existence here and now, but it does not *existieren*. It is not *Sein*, — this is too broad a term, covering existence of all sorts. It is not *Leben*, for this is shared by men with animals and plants. *Existenz* is peculiarly human and limited by Kierkegaard to only a part of humanity. The child does not have it, neither does the non-Christian. *Existenz* is, for Kierkegaard, the experience of the Christian as he develops his spiritual powers, faces crises, makes

decisions, summons his whole personality to meet the demands of faith. *Existenz* is to live with *Interesse*, with *Leidenschaft*, also with *Entscheidung*. Further, *Existenz* is in time, whereas both *Dasein* and *Sein* are indifferent to time. Again, *Existenz* pays attention to the claims of both time and eternity, as *Leben* cannot. It is the combination, Kierkegaard says, of *Anschauung* and *Sein*, also of *Leben* and *Sein*, — an attempt, that is, to do justice to life with its movement, the object of intuition in its timelessness, and the structure of being which encompasses both, and which in a paradoxical way must be accepted for what it is and also remade by personal effort. *Existenz* is an interpretation of being which is lived through, an understanding of reality which by personal decision adds to reality. It is, Kierkegaard says, reduplication, a doubling or living over again in time of that which is seen objectively as timeless idea. It requires not intellectual agreement but personal sharing, not the acceptance of doctrine but active participation in the truth.

The truth in which we must learn to participate is a revealed truth, that is, a gift from above which occurs not in the natural course of events but through the ingression into history of the absurdity of the Incarnation. This is the supreme datum, the given fact, the condition to which we must adjust ourselves. Our life of personal suffering and personal decisiveness is our way of responding to the absolute God, who in his absolute difference from us has sent the God-man to reveal the way of life. The fact that his coming is a scandal to our reason only goes to show that reason is not the final arbiter.

We meet this revelation, then, with a personal faith which each must win as an individual. It is not reasonable, for it is based on the absurd, nor ethical, for it leads to what Kierkegaard calls the "teleological suspension of ethics." Ethics has to do with universal principles, faith is private. Ethics submits its principles to discussion, but faith is silent. Ethically speaking Abraham's willingness to sacrifice Isaac was murder, but according to faith it was trust in the absolute. Kant and Hegel missed the difference between ethics and religion since Kant would have us consider our duties as divine commands and Hegel could not distinguish between ethical and religious obli-

gation. In opposition to this Kierkegaard claims that there is a particular duty with a specific content, directed toward God alone, and involving a personal relationship which cannot be universalized. It is easy to ask philosophical questions about reality in general, Kierkegaard maintains, but difficult to get at the individual thing in its uniqueness. The intellect may prove the fact of immortality in general but it never shows that this man himself survives death. Religion therefore confronts both philosophy and ethics with the great "Incommensurable" which we apprehend only personally. In some cases this personal apprehension means a higher degree of certainty than any intellectual criticism can bring. The historical facts about the life of Jesus are, for example, uncertain and relative. Subjective faith in Christ is, however, absolutely certain in the passion of faith. The Paradox or Incommensurable is to the Jews (that is, the practical reason) an offence, to the Greeks (the pure reason) foolishness, to the Christian (that is, to faith), salvation.

Faith is personal again in that it asks not what to believe, but what to do, not the evidences for Christ, but how to become a Christian. It means setting the whole man to work in the act of making a decision. It is based on dread, which is a primal impulse, and on the despair which each man must feel as he regards his lot. It centers in the God-man who cannot be known by ordinary means because he came *incognito*, appearing first as a child in a manger, taking the form of a servant, surrounding himself with fishermen at the same time that he claimed to be God, asserting his rule by drawing his followers from the humblest of folk.

If faith is personal and individual it is also dialectical, since personal experience has its unresolved paradoxes, its questions and partial answers, its repeated withdrawal into itself and projection into the outer world. Kierkegaard believed that Hegel's dialectic ultimately resolved all differences and provided therefore a specious unity. His own dialectic tried to allow for individual differences and to retain their private unresolvable quality. As we notice this we cannot help asking whether his interest in individual differences was compatible with his faith

in an all-encompassing God through whom alone goodness is revealed. Let us examine one of his own instances of dialectic and see what it implies.

The first noteworthy stage in the advance of life toward religion is the aesthetic. The aesthetic man has an immediate romantic interest in the world about him and an ability to taste its pleasures without inquiring too seriously into their consequences. This state of mind is not bad, says Kierkegaard, but it is not truly responsible. It makes one think of the stone which leaves the hand to skip over the water and to sink finally in complete forgetfulness. It may be expressed in any one of a number of forms — in art, science, romantic love, and even in religion of the feeling type. Yet it lacks consciousness of the ego as that which is separate and discontinuous with its environment. Reflection means making a break with one's surroundings, where aesthetic enjoyment means accepting them uncritically. After the aesthetic stage comes the ethical with its distinction between is and ought-to-be. It recognizes the fact that I will not, but I should. The universal law points in one direction, my acts follow another. The penitence with which I recognize this leads to the third stage, that of universal religion. Here the universal law is revered with religious adoration, but Kierkegaard finds this also insufficient. A God of the universal law is an immanent God and our knowledge of him is continuous, immanent knowledge, bound up with the rest of my experiences. The final stage is the paradox religion, where God who is himself external to man and higher than his thought comes down to man's level in the Christian revelation. This is a scandal, but as such it shocks men into obedience. What can become history only contrary to human understanding has actually become history. Man acting according to the laws of his own nature could not get hold of this truth, therefore in his own nature he must be untruth. God gives him a new nature and provides the conditions for understanding the truth as well as the truth itself. God comes discontinuously, suddenly, in a moment. We must attain simultaneity with this moment, taking its truth into ourselves by an act of decision which transcends the time represented in the flow of our experience yet in

its emotional quality is removed from the timelessness of the abstract idea.

Several questions arise here. Is it not true, first of all, that in remaining loyal to his idea that individual differences should be retained and not glossed over by the universal, Kierkegaard has given us a dialectic in which each step has its own intrinsic importance? It would seem that the aesthetic and the moral are not completely left behind when the religious stage is reached. The process is described throughout with great aesthetic charm and great moral power, and Kierkegaard shows far too much sympathy with aesthetic, moral, and reasonable ideals and too much understanding of what they mean to allow us to believe that he dismissed them out of hand. Secondly, is the transition to the religious moment so abrupt, then, as Kierkegaard makes it? Does he not give us a continuous dialectic, a real progression, as contrasted with a succession of completely unrelated steps? The lower stages prepare the way for the higher, just as in his own literary method a series of illustrations prepares the way for the conclusion. What shall we say, then, in the third place, of his much exploited pessimism as to human nature and of his teaching that the soul must depend on divine grace alone for the attainment of its highest good?

The fact appears to be that Kierkegaard was himself not sure about man's complete helplessness. In books published within two years of each other he both affirms and denies the doctrine of inherited, radical evil. Obviously his whole work is tinged with a deeply pessimistic shade and his figures are lugubrious in the extreme. Faith comes, he says, on the basis of dread. As a man placed prematurely in his coffin struggles to communicate with his friends, so must the soul placed in the bonds of finitude strive for communication with the absolute. No complacent professor of philosophy need suppose that through his own critical acumen he can find the way to God. We are infected by evil, paralyzed by it, and can get rid of it only by being taken out of ourselves.

Yet it is hard to see how we can be taken out of ourselves unless we have from the start the potentiality for such a change and how we can receive with meekness the engrafted word un-

less the capacity for receiving the word be a part of our inherited equipment. Furthermore, it is impossible to follow Kierkegaard's account of the dialectical process by which evil is overcome without feeling that at least a part of the initiative comes from the individual soul itself and that the triumph is partly its own. The influence of ἀγάπη is present without doubt, but ἔρως is also at work and it is emphasized especially in his sermons, where Kierkegaard makes much of human love and brotherhood. Further, it is difficult to see what all this emphasis on reduplication, that is on taking the truth as our own, and living it over again, can mean unless it is that we ourselves have something to do and must do it effectively. The pessimism is there, unquestionably, but it forms a background for the hope, and although the hope is based on the belief in divine intervention it implies also an active moral struggle which loses all point unless there be a human moral will which can be set to work.

If we read between the lines we find in Kierkegaard, therefore, a confidence in the initial capacities of the individual and we find evidence also of a belief in certain objective standards by which these capacities can test themselves as they develop. What else can his constant reiteration of the fact of "responsibility" mean? He claims, for example, that his ethics is more responsible than Plato's, for where Plato allows us to fall back on the universal idea and to make it bear the brunt of the defense, he himself throws the responsibility squarely on the shoulders of the individual in his acts of personal decision. Each must decide for himself just as each must die for himself. It is the general idea which is irresponsible, whether it appears in the intellectualized universal conceptions of Hegel or the complacent conventionality of the established Danish church. Yet Kierkegaard does not make clear how one can responsibly accept a revelation which offers itself on the basis of its own sovereign, that is, arbitrary, authority, and boasts of its independence of critical or moral standards. It is not sufficient merely to name this a "paradox." What Kierkegaard must mean is that it is a seeming untruth or an insufficiently clarified truth which, when accepted and made a guide for life, will reveal its actual truth and justify itself both rationally and pragmati-

cally. And as a matter of fact, this is just what he, in common with all other believers in special revelation, actually goes on to demonstrate. He shows continually that what is accepted in humility approves itself to reason and works for righteousness. In this sense it is the movement of the dialectic and the unresolved but progressively resolving mystery that attends it which he is really emphasizing. We start with a capacity for moral achievement which, because it is personal and individual, has an aura of mystery and unclassifiability about it. We go on to accept a revelation which we do not clearly understand but which points in the direction of our moral interest. As we grow into the meaning of this revelation we find external means of testing it but we never lose our sense for its problematic character, which includes the mysteriousness of the fact that it and we are here at all and its own transcendence of anything that we are or can do. It is in the combination of this mysterious and personal emotional quality on the one hand and the rational and moral standards on the other that the secret of life is to be found. Kierkegaard emphasizes the former and does it in such an exaggerated way as to make us think that he turned his back on the latter. But the emphasis is that of the preacher who has a special point to make.

His puzzling and often repeated statement that subjectivity is the truth must be taken in the same way. He does not mean to teach anarchical individualism, nor is he interested in philosophical idealism. He does not say that each man is the measure of all things nor that the truth is subjectivity. What he seems to mean is that the truth must be grasped by us in an inner experience of appropriation. Like the pragmatists he would affirm that truth is not abstract but in a real sense is what we do about the facts with which we are confronted. Whether you think of truth as agreement of thinking with being or of being with thinking, he says in the *Postscript*, you must take account of the subject who does the thinking. What are his possibilities? He cannot leave his inward predispositions behind and become wholly objective. He himself, an unreasonable person, cannot attain the serene objectivity of the truth to which he aspires. Even when he attains the truth he himself does not become a

reasonable person. A crazy man can repeat the truth that the earth is round and remain crazy. A *Privatdozent* can say in the lecture-room that all is disputable and then go on to write his own system as that which will put an end to all disputes. Truth in becoming life must become irrational. This is why the highest truth is not for reason but for life, — a paradox which faith must accept. Truth, we say, is agreement with being. But if being is taken as empirical, it is only becoming, not real being, whereas if thinking is taken as not part of becoming but eternal, you lose the difference between being and thinking and have simply a tautology. The solution comes when we see that Descartes's ego is an abstraction from the real ego. The real ego has an active interest in which being and thinking are brought together. We may put the matter in terms of the distinction between essence and existence. In the world of logical essences all is necessary; in the world of existence things come into being not of necessity, and therefore through freedom. Hegel dodged the idea of how the idea becomes concrete, that is, of what the transition actually means. Actually the idea becomes concrete through the active will. We know directly the logical essence or what a thing is; we do not know immediately that it is. Thus we must meet events in history or in the world of becoming with belief, and belief requires faith, which in turn requires volitional effort.

Several features of this argument call for attention. We observe, in the first place, that Kierkegaard actually teaches not a thoroughgoing subjectivism but rather a sane and healthy relativism. When he says that subjectivity is the truth he means that an initial act of will and a constant effort toward personal appropriation are necessary parts of the process by which truth is known to us. Subjectivity is one factor in the advance toward the truth. Incidentally, he describes the relativism so well that it is a question whether he himself is able to overcome it completely in his discussion of the absolutism of revelation. Secondly, he does not press his subjectivism even to the point of philosophical idealism. What he offers is instead a dualism of essence and existence which points in the direction of a pragmatic realism. We know the essence but we accept exist-

ence pragmatically and test our knowledge by external standards which existence itself provides. Throughout his work Kierkegaard's rejection of idealism is whole-hearted. Idealism fails to make allowance for individual differences, and for such facts as mystery and evil, and it transforms man into a spectator instead of a participant. Kierkegaard is fundamentally a realist, and limits his subjectivism in that fact. Third, insofar as he accepts subjectivism it is to emphasize the part played by the individual, and this emphasis is not in accord with his teaching concerning the helplessness of the individual soul.

This leads us to ask whether the net result of his work must not be considered to be quite different from what he supposed it to be. He compared the world of time, including human effort and activity, with the world of eternity and God's saving grace in such a way as to make the former seem wholly unimportant. Yet by a paradox which goes deeper than those he himself described we feel the power of the man and the author at the same time that we reject the thesis he was trying to prove. Kierkegaard preached "Either—Or" but he convinces us of the necessity of "Both—And." He taught pessimism and subjectivism and also the helplessness of the human soul. Yet he himself was not helpless, in spite of his many assertions to that effect, nor was he without confidence in human potentiality, nor did he despair wholly of human ideals or reject completely all rational and pragmatic standards for truth and virtue. He tried to free men from general rules but in the attempt made use of general rules himself. He preached the uselessness of human effort yet summoned men to greater effort.

Through it all he taught by implication the kind of religion he professed most greatly to despise, the religion of a man of culture. From his specific statements as to the content of religion we recoil. He claimed to go back to the Gospels, yet his teaching is at a far remove from that of him who said: Suffer the little children to come unto me. He professed to believe in humility before the absolute God, but his teaching does not allow the child or the Buddhist or the Jew or the liberal the right to be humble. Yet in spite of his specific denials of the rights of humanity as such we think of him as one who asserted

these rights in a peculiarly persuasive way. He is not a theologian in the strict sense, for he does not offer proofs for God, but he is an excellent psychologist, a great literary artist, and, especially in his sermons on love and justice, a popular leader of consummate skill. The religion he actually gives us is the fruition and not the denial of man's attempt to follow the best that is in him. It is Kierkegaard's understanding of man, coupled with his great aesthetic sensitiveness and his power as a literary artist, which makes him a force today, not his fanatical devotion to a narrow creed. He tried to take men away from the search for God and into the presence of God himself but actually he showed in eloquent and dramatic fashion what the search for God can mean.

The extravagances and exaggerations in Kierkegaard's own life helped him as an imaginative writer but they put us on our guard against taking his statements on religion too literally. The extreme moods to which he was subject and the elaborate devices he employed to stimulate creative effort in his romantic period both suggest what we should today call an element of exhibitionism. The point to notice is that so long as his tumultuous feelings were confined within his own subjective life they became either exaggerated enthusiasms or morbid depression. When they found outlet in literary creation they became great art. Kierkegaard's short life shows remarkable productivity which would not have been possible had he not found by literary expression a means of salvation in the universal communicable idea which he professed to despise. It is no accident that his favorite composer was the serene, objective Mozart. Kierkegaard thus teaches a limited, provincial type of religion through the medium of an art based on classical standards of form. He was neither so pessimistic nor so subjective as he believed himself to be and his work has significance for us today because in it the personal and subjective is purified and disciplined by the universal he affected to deny.

What, then, do we gain from him? Chiefly, it seems to me, a sense for the dialectic of human experience as it wrestles with its own subjective problems and by finding help in the universal standards of art and reason gropes its way toward the absolute-

ness of the divine. Kierkegaard makes us keenly aware of the problem the individual confronts in his own soul in all its mystery, its unclassifiability and its moral urgency. He suggests also that relief from its burden can be found in the shared values which our common life brings, and that although the problem remains an individual one there must be progress out of the mire of subjectivism by the use of the supports offered by other men and by the ideal values we share with other men. The decisions are the individual's own but he is not alone in making them. Each life is isolated but it is capable of being redeemed. Kierkegaard finds redemption only in the Christian revelation, but his own putting of the case suggests that the revelation is not so completely discontinuous with all else as he says that it is.

Kierkegaard is thus a writer who constantly points beyond his own words. For the special problems of a time of social ferment like our own he has, for example, only a partial answer. He helps us to see that there should be no bowing and scraping before the socio-economic issue, and no refusal to call one's soul one's own in the active eagerness to share one's property. Yet he does not see what is really implied in the economic problem. Like Ortega in our own time he obviously felt that mass power meant an evasion of individual responsibility and was to be shunned. He turned his back on the revolution of 1848 and one is forced to believe that today he would retire into his ivory tower and abet, however unintentionally, the forces of power and prejudice with which we are compelled to reckon. His limitations appear in the indecisive practical answers he gave to his own questions. Life is bad, he says. Should one then destroy one's self? No, for this would be an evasion of responsibility. Should one escape to the cloister? No, for this would be an outward expression of what should be only an inner attitude. Should one enter into the life of one's time — have regular employment, raise a family, vote and fight for social issues? Yes, said Kierkegaard, since these are part of the claim the absolute has on you. Yet he himself did none of them.

It is inconclusiveness of this kind which accounts for the fact that there are no real Kierkegaardians today though there are many who claim to have gone out from him and that it was from

him that the initial impetus came. It is a striking fact that, although he had no metaphysical theory of his own, contemporary philosophers have found that his work provides the stimulus for a new attack on metaphysics. His own hints as to the structure of reality fall under two heads. The first is a pluralistic emphasis on human centers of energy and decisiveness which, through their ability to transform the material presented to them, engage in creation. In *Existenz*, that is in human experience in its decisive, purposeful character, the energies of the personality organize themselves to produce significant reality out of meaningless neutral stuff. To a certain extent this makes us think of our modern empiricisms with their emphasis on the transformation within human centers of interest of the undifferentiated mass of experience. The second hint Kierkegaard gives is that the dialectic progression in human life is an example of the total process of history. This, it must be admitted, is a surmise and not a direct inference from his work. He is dealing with psychology, not metaphysics, and with the Christian tradition, not the world of reality as a whole. Yet he shows so much interest in time, process, history, and the creative moments it produces, that one does not have to stretch his theory of the work of God so very far beyond the limits he assigns to it to make it include the whole creation, of which the Christian tradition is but one aspect. This possible development of *Existenz* comes out more clearly in the work of Heidegger and Jaspers.

Kierkegaard confronts us with the absolute; Heidegger turns our attention toward our immediate environment. Kierkegaard sees man as lonely: Heidegger points to his association with nature, with things, with animals, and with other men. Kierkegaard stresses the drastic change made by man's purposeful decisions. Heidegger is more concerned with the continuous process and its connectedness than with the abrupt transitions occurring within it. Kierkegaard is a Lutheran in agony over his own soul, and a melancholy Dane brooding over his relation to the infinite. Heidegger has some of the same serious intensity of purpose, but he also shares the faith of a Roman Catholic who is content to leave things in the care of a good God, and he is, furthermore, a *Schwarzwald* peasant willing to accept the com-

mon earthiness of things as in its own way productive of goodness. Kierkegaard emphasizes the sharpness of the distinctions between eternity and time, faith and knowledge, Christianity and religion. Heidegger is catholic in the universal as well as the specific sense and is ready to accept the Christian religion as a natural development of the thought of Hebrews and Greeks.

Because he combines so many different interests it is difficult to fit Heidegger into our ordinary classifications. He takes the moral problems of Christianity as of paramount importance yet he tries, as the Greeks did, to answer them in an ontological way. At the same time his ontology, for all its abstractness, is tied so closely to ordinary common human relationships that in a certain sense he may be called a pragmatist, especially as he often makes use of the word πρᾶγμα. He is concerned with the problem of truth but he makes it an aspect of the problem of being and he treats being as a set of practical relationships. He is definitely a realist in his epistemology and yet his account of the knowing relation puts as much stress on what the subject does to the object as what the object does to the subject. His point appears to be that in knowledge we transcend or jump out of ourselves and go directly to the thing itself by discovering the nature of the relations which actually bind us to the thing and seeing the "with-ness" or connectedness which is an inherent aspect of human experience. Human beings have *Existenz* and this, he agrees with Kierkegaard, means historical existence in time, with the unfolding of possibilities which time implies, but they also have *Dasein*, and in this fact of "placedness" here and now Heidegger finds a significance which Kierkegaard did not. To occupy a special place is to have a special set of possibilities and to exist in a special set of relations, and it is these which reflective philosophy should make clear. In the fact of our original bound-togetherness Heidegger finds the clue to the nature of being, of truth, and of philosophy itself, since the last named is but the conscious expression and conscious taking account of our status in our various relationships. The aboriginal condition of relatedness Heidegger constantly emphasizes. Truth, for example, is not that which happens to an idea, or that which occurs when a judgment is formed, but the primary situation

from which the ideas or the judgments take their rise. The peasant has his own naïve and direct relation to his environment and we cannot say that the scientist, because he abstracts from this, finds a truth which is higher. The truth is that in which all of us share and our problem is to discover the elusive quality which makes sharing possible in a constantly changing world.

Heidegger, we have said, goes back to Greek ontology and uses it as a means for interpreting the Christian moral problem, but he finds that Greek ontology suffered from a peculiar limitation. In the first place, the Greeks limited the word "is" to the copulative function it performs in the sentence. In the second place, they failed to get away from their essentially negative interpretation of truth. To illustrate the first point Heidegger shows that although the Greeks spoke of philosophy as love of wisdom they made it one of the "-ologies," that is, one of the sciences based on the spoken word and spoken proposition. For them the problem of philosophy centered in the meaning of the copula "is" as it appeared in the proposition. This meaning of "is" reveals, however, only one aspect of being. The subject-predicate situation is only one part of the larger subject-object situation. When I say, for example, that this crayon is white I am talking about a white crayon which exists as object for me as subject. The problem is less that of seeing how whiteness can be attached to the crayon than of understanding the total situation in which white crayons, our experience of them, and we ourselves are bound together. The relation implied in the judgment is not primary but rests back on the more fundamental relation of "withness" or *Sein-bei* and it is this which we must uncover.

The apparently trivial fact that we can directly mean or point at an object is, therefore, what we must explore. Heidegger here appears to be concerned with the same problem of intentionality which Husserl inherited from Brentano, but he takes it up in a different way. Truth, he says, is the uncovering of the hiddenness implied in our direct relation with the object. It is the *Unverborgenheit* of the *Dasein*, that is, the removal of the concealment of the relation which binds us to the object. The Greeks meant this when they used the word ἀλήθεια which is the

combination of alpha privative and λανθάνω. Truth is taking the concealment away and revealing the connection which our artificial questions have obscured. But the Greeks failed to see that their conception of truth as the "unconcealed" was essentially negative and so never solved the problem of how the hiddenness is taken away. Our task is to see in what respect truth is a character of the things themselves, not of the propositions about them. We can take the concealment away by seeing what *Dasein* actually is. *Dasein* means *in-der-Welt-sein*, and in the case of human beings it means *miteinandersein*, social being, existing together with others. Heidegger now goes on to ask what togetherness means, what a thing must be like if we can exist "together" with it, how its sameness is apprehended by different subjects, what kind of sharing is possible when several minds are engaged with the same object, and how human "togetherness" differs from inanimate. Throughout his procedure Heidegger shows the influence both of Husserl's phenomenological method and of his own scholastic realism in that he keeps asking what the essence of the thing or the situation can be, and how it can be understood for what it is in and of itself.

Heidegger thus begins with a direct attack upon what we immediately experience, but he soon finds that what we experience is itself far from simple. Our experience of the object is direct and not mediated by the proposition, but the objects and our experiences of them are of many kinds. He then tries to bring out the distinctions by using many words to express what is usually included under one and talks, for example, of the *Befragten* of the *Dasein*, the *Gefragten* of the *Sein*, and the *Erfragten* of the *Sinn von Sein*. At times this seems merely to add to the obscurity which surrounds so much of his work, but at other times one must admit that he uses the German language to bring out distinctions which are none the less real for the fact that English has no way of expressing them. Thus he points out five different kinds of existence: man has *Dasein*, or *Existenz* as a special type of *Dasein*, animals have *Leben*, material things have *Vorhandensein*, useful things *Zuhandensein*, and for abstractions such as number and space we must use the word *Bestehen*.

It will be observed that by Heidegger the phenomenological method is not confined, as with Husserl, to logical essences but is applied to a much richer and more varied field. Husserl is concerned only with the object as "bracketed," "reduced," removed from time and space. Heidegger is less restricted and more inclined to expand the method into a theory of reality which takes account of the object in its concrete empirical fulness. Thus he begins his lectures to students at Freiburg by referring to the university situation and the problems of contemporary life. Philosophy itself, he says, begins with the process by which we work out of ourselves into the immediate environment. *Was ist Philosophie? Philosophie ist philosophieren. Und was ist philosophieren? Philosophieren ist transcendieren.* And what is it to transcend? To transcend is to realize one's nature as man in its bound-togetherness with circumstance yet its independence. It is to go directly to the object in the flash of awareness which Plato described by the metaphor of the kindling of a spark. It is to find the meaning of being by catching sight of being in yourself, as you face your work, your obligations, your social relationships, your common, daily life.

As he proceeds, Heidegger develops his own view of the polarized tension between opposing influences and of the dialectic by which it is overcome. His paradoxes soon become as numerous as those of Kierkegaard. He prides himself on the fact that *Sein und Zeit* was written in his home in the *Schwarzwald* surrounded by peasant life, but we cannot help wondering whether the peasants themselves would recognize the ideas they are supposed to have produced. Heidegger professes naïve realism, but is actually one of the most sophisticated of thinkers. Further, he would relieve us from the tyranny of words and take us back to the immediate unverbalized situation, yet his own effects come from his special way of exploiting words. Whereas Kierkegaard writes poetry which he intends us to take as revelation and prophecy, Heidegger claims for his own poetry the exactness of philosophical analysis. Thus his argument proceeds by drawing first on primitive immediate awareness, then on sophisticated distinction, relying now on the delicate coloring of the passing mood and again on rigid external standards of criti-

cism. Another type of polarity appears also in his emphasis at times on continuity, at other times on divisiveness.

For although he makes so much of the fact that man is tied together with other men and with things, and that being, meaning, and value are bound together in the bundle of life, he no sooner exhibits the unity of all reality than he begins to divide the parts from one another. We must distinguish, he says, the various possibilities that confront man in his immediate situation. Will he achieve *Existenz* or will he sink back into the condition of *Verfallenheit*? Will he come to himself or lose himself, will he attain his essential, authentic selfhood, his *eigentliches Existenz*, or will he remain completely dominated by mass opinion, doing the average thing and accepting current standards uncritically? The man of the crowd is irresponsible because controlled by his deterministic environment. He sees and hears for the "kick" he gets out of it, not for the purpose of understanding. Held down by irresolution and compromise the "it is said" of conventional opinion becomes his authority. He loses his actual selfhood because he is unwilling to stand alone.

This, says Heidegger, is only too real a possibility, since togetherness is an omnipresent aspect of our life. Yet this downward pull is met by the pull of individuality and life is characterized by the tension between the two. A man achieves individuality by becoming aware of the possibilities which characterize individual existence. Chief among these is the possibility of death and the care or anxiety it brings. It is the awareness of the inevitability of death which separates a man from his fellows and marks out the possibilities which are truly his. To get out of *Verfallenheit* or immersion in the crowd means to feel one's way into the kind of fear which accompanies conscience and to be sensitive to the blameworthiness in our nature. When we become aware not of the goodness or badness of a single act nor of conscience as a prudential force keeping us out of trouble, but of the seriousness of life as a whole, in its aspect as the container of possibilities which must be realized in time and before death, we achieve *Existenz*. Only the self which exists in time and binds past and future together in the unity of present possibility can do this.

Whereas Kierkegaard asks how one can become a Christian, Heidegger thus asks how one can in the fullest sense become a man, that is, an actual self responsive to the various strands of influence in his environment and actively girding himself to realize the possibilities they imply. A man should not think of himself as *Geist*, a thinking subject, a spinner of propositions, a spectator. He is a participant bound up in an existence which gives him immediate relations of feeling and doing with the world about him. It is not thought which explains existence but existence which contains many rich relations, among them that of thought. We must understand this web of influences which surrounds us and see how each of us can act as a focal point for the forces which stream into us from our environment. Furthermore, we must differentiate these influences from each other. Ordinary objects have *Vorhandenheit*, useful things have *Zuhandenheit*, and the difference is important. The crowd, likewise, is *vorhanden*, our friends are *zuhanden*, not as objects of use but as objects of emotional interest. The world itself, in the same way, can be an object to be observed or a friend to be loved. *Cogito* is but one possible attitude of the ego which expresses itself in *sum*.

Heidegger's real power appears to come from the fact that he is able both to make subtle subjective distinctions and to keep his realistic sense for the objective situation. We think of the idealists as especially competent when it comes to the description of mental life with the variety of its values, but Heidegger is as subtle as they, and also more inclusive, since the intellectual values do not have first claim on him. At the same time his account of the external world as vivid and colorful in its own right retains and justifies the realism of the plain man of which philosophy has so often lost sight. Beside the richness of his account of experience and its objects, idealisms on the one hand and positivistic materialisms on the other seem one-sided and thin. Heidegger is suggestive also in his ability to find spiritual significance not only in the distinctions among values but in man's *Geworfenheit*, his "placedness," the givenness of his lot. In the very fact that we are here in the world of nature, without having chosen to be placed here, he finds a source of responsi-

bility. We are responsible, that is to say, not merely to the "ought" but to the "is," to the factual condition as well as to the value.

Furthermore, one can hardly deny that with all its wordiness, and in part because of it, his treatment of the nature of being is very suggestive. In one sense his entire work can be called a commentary on the ontological proof. In what sense, he asks, does the fact that things possess natures of a certain sort have implications for their existence? The delicate distinctions imply differences not merely of quality but of being. Man's very existence is conditioned by the fact that his nature is of a certain kind. This means, in turn, that existence is not all of a piece. In Kant's work, for example, existence should not be limited to *Wirklichkeit* but should be construed as *Realität*, that is, what belongs to a thing by virtue of the fact that it is a thing, or *res*. A possibility, again, is not an intellectual abstraction but a *Grund*, a dynamic influence as it was for Aristotle. The principle of contradiction, once more, states a rule which is not psychological but logical, and it is our task to discover the nature of the existing situation which provides such a rule.

Heidegger's power, like that of Kierkegaard, appears to come from the suggestiveness of his special insights rather than from the persuasiveness of his work as a whole. He is at his best in his interpretations of individual thinkers and is often brilliant in his explanations of what the problem of the relation of being to thought meant for Aristotle, Leibniz, or Kant. Aristotle is the historical figure to whom he stands nearest. He shares Aristotle's interest in the problem of being as such and wrestles constantly with the question of the ὄν ᾗ ὄν. Like Aristotle also, he is a realist and, in his own way, an empiricist, and is much concerned with the problem of becoming and the actualization of possibilities. The trouble is that he does not share Aristotle's exactness. In his admiration for the Greeks he tries to use German as the Greeks used their language, employing many words to bring out differing shades of meaning. He carries the method so far, however, that the distinctions become too complicated for either the common man or the trained student to follow. When he turns verbs into prepositions and prepositions into

verbs it becomes a shock method, which jolts the reader and in its way stimulates him, but does not necessarily lead to agreement. His interest in communication and in the ties which bind man to man and man to environment seems not to have brought real understanding of the conditions which must underlie the shared experience. Thus in spite of all his emphasis on togetherness he remains an exponent of a philosophy of a lonely and isolated type.

Kierkegaard describes the soul's struggle to find God, Heidegger tells what happens when it faces the fact of death. In the work of Karl Jaspers the subjective and individualistic elements in *Existenz-philosophie* are brought out as prominently. Jaspers introduces also a note of tragic doubt which is lacking in the others. Whereas Kierkegaard is sure of the final triumph of divine grace Jaspers never loses his sense of the incompleteness of any answer to life's problems, and where Heidegger too often turns to a facile verbal solution Jaspers retains a dogged uncompromising quality which accepts indecisiveness as the tragic price of honesty. Thus although Jaspers uses the words "fear and trembling" less often than Kierkegaard, and "death," "care," and "guilt" less often than Heidegger, his philosophy carries on the lonely individualistic tradition. Jaspers's work is in fact an excellent example of one type of German philosophizing where the thinker with great effort draws ideas out of his own intuitive life, and then submits them again and again to interpretation in his own private experience, trying to work their meaning out for himself and to live it through personally instead of bringing it before the bar of public criticism. His concern is with reality as it unfolds within the self and with thinking as the constant reinterpretation of inner data. Although he is more interested in science than is Heidegger and came to philosophy after training in psychopathology, he is, like Kierkegaard, an artist in that he strives continually to embody the same form in new material and to reach the aesthetic universal which is imbedded in human emotion, as contrasted with the logical universal which is attained through critical analysis.

One peculiarity of his terminology should receive special notice. For Jaspers *Dasein* is the kind of existence with which

science deals and which furnishes only a point of departure and a limitation that philosophy must overcome. *Existenz* is that type of being which is accompanied by freedom and makes possible ethical decisions. *Sein* denotes the metaphysical kind of being which pertains to *Transcendenz* as the absolute world above human life.

Heidegger, a realist, in sympathy with Catholicism, explores the thing in itself. Jaspers, influenced by idealism and Protestantism, begins with inner autonomy. Individuality, he says, is menaced today from three sides. Theories of society, of the unconscious, of the race, are fast crowding out our personal life. Marx and Freud have done their part, and now the experts on eugenics and race theories are coming to the fore. But no sociologist can explain to me my destiny as free will, no psychologist can show what I am to myself, no race theorist can breed a true individual. Man must rely on his own inward spontaneity and must ever rebel against thinking of himself as merely a result of outward forces.

There are three ways of philosophizing or developing the inner datum. The first is what Jaspers calls *Welt-orientierung*. This is the process of discovery carried on by the sciences. It is important in its way but subject always to the antinomies in our thought; it is also incomplete and likely to become inflexible. Science builds shells for itself out of ideas, Jaspers says, and tends to rest content with them when it should always be ready to slough them off and begin anew. The sciences also describe the world as self-subsistent, and here they dodge a fundamental problem. We know that the world did not come into being of itself, and yet we do not know what produced it. Here, therefore, we confront one of those limiting situations which are characteristic of the process of *Welt-orientierung* and mark its insufficiency.

We pass then to *Existenz-erhellung*. This means, literally, illumination of personal existence, that is, explanation and realization of what it implies. Personal existence emphasizes the developing, historical aspect of the truth it discovers. Thus *Existenz* recognizes the fact of time yet attains a vantage point above time. It stresses the unrepeatable sequence in the suc-

cession of its intuitive experiences and yet recognizes that the intuitive act is outside the time stream. "*Ich bin nur aus Zeitdasein und bin selbst nicht zeitlich.*" To put the matter in another way, *Existenz* is possible only through the separation, opposition, and final synthesis of subject and object in the experience of interpretation carried on by the subject itself. The individual should not try to orient himself to what is outside but to bring the external within. Instead of trying to grasp objective reality he should look within and find in inner control the means of overcoming the subject-object dualism. Instead of the idealistic view of an all-embracing consciousness which comes to itself in humanity, we should think of the human subject as able to externalize itself by developing the distinctive things in its own nature. Being as object is understood through being as freedom. In the words of a French commentator on Jaspers, *Existenz* in his hands is Hegelianism turned inside out.

This sounds like complete surrender to the ego-centric predicament, yet two ways of escape are offered. The first is through communication, which is an essential and for Jaspers a very important part of the unfolding process of reality. Communication means a binding together and achieving of mutuality of those of like mind, an almost mystical exaltation in which union is achieved with the soul of another. Love is one of the highest and one of the most necessary elements in the process of *Existenz*. Communion with the kindred soul is one of the surest ways to harmonious relations with one's self.

In the next place, there is what Jaspers calls the metaphysical striving for *Transcendenz*. Here he makes use of conceptions which remind us of Heidegger's *Geworfenheit*. Though each of us is free, the conditions for freedom have been given from outside. From the experience of his own limitations and of the antinomies inherent in all experience, e.g., the insolubility of the problem why there should be being and not non-being, each individual becomes aware of the absolute being which sets the conditions for personal existence. As we feel the presence of this being we try to read its ciphers. The ability to read the cipher of the outer world as a symbol of transcendence is the

peak of philosophical effort. Even here we must recognize the importance of freedom, for this highest activity is not automatic. Each day we must rouse ourselves to take part in it anew. Beside this reading of the cipher of being all earthly knowledge is as shipwreck. The transcendent is known, it would appear, not merely as God is known in religious experience, nor as a presupposition is inferred from the conditions of life, nor empirically through the senses, yet in a way which seems to combine all three. We are restless until we rest in it, we infer its presence, we read its cipher. Yet the last cipher is indecisive, and we come to the end of the three volume work on philosophy with the feeling that the search itself is what is important, as contrasted with any goal or end.

This very brief and sketchy indication of the direction in which Jaspers's thought moves is perhaps sufficient to suggest that in spite of their differences from Kierkegaard both he and Heidegger maintain today the Kierkegaardian tradition. They break with Kierkegaard in that they try to develop an ontology where he was interested in personal salvation. They are also concerned with personal salvation, however, and we observe that they do not make knowledge of their ontology a condition for attaining salvation. In this respect both philosophers stand nearer to Kierkegaard than do the crisis theologians who have claimed him for their own. In effect if not in intention the latter have made impossible the act described by Kierkegaard as the simple acceptance of God's grace, since they have erected an elaborate system of theological beliefs which must be adopted before God's grace can begin to operate. Heidegger and Jaspers are nearer to Kierkegaard's spirit in that they have tried to describe what actually occurs instead of prescribing the conditions for its occurrence.

In several respects, furthermore, they have interests in common with contemporary philosophers of the English-speaking world. The conception of reality as an abstract mass of experience characterized by certain human creative centers which find their highest good in developing freedom and an appreciation of mutuality makes us think of Dewey. These centers of experience, again, are not unlike prehensions in Whitehead's

sense, and the moving mass of reality against which they are set is not unlike Whitehead's process. For both Heidegger and Jaspers, as for Whitehead, time is of the essence of the unit of reality. For all three thinkers, also, awareness of environment depends on what may be called a ground swell of emotional apprehension on the surface of which ideas play as flashes of discriminating insight. The principle of individuation by which one center is divided from another and from the environment is if anything clearer in the German thinkers than in Whitehead because for them it goes back to conscience and to an experience of dread in the presence of death.

What then shall we say of *Existenz-philosophie*? Has it anything to offer? Is there a place for a subjective, non-rational emphasis in contemporary religious thought? "To thine own self be true," we often quote from Polonius to support our belief in the subjective values, but are we not prone to forget that Polonius was a fool? "*Grau theurer Freund, ist alle Theorie, und grün des Lebens goldener Baum*" we use as a statement to bear out our faith in the living qualities of the irrational, but do we always remember that Goethe put these words in the mouth of the devil? The subjective and the irrational have their important place, but when we make them guiding principles for life the result is apt to be foolishness or deviltry. *Existenz* avoids these extremes by making non-rational individuality one pole in the dialectical process in which the shared experience is the other pole. At times its expounders forget this second pole and their philosophy becomes verbiage. The worst offender here is Heidegger, whose use of words sometimes suggests an uncontrolled rather than a creative imagination. Jaspers in his desperate earnestness is more disciplined, and the most adverse criticism that can be made in his case is that he tends to make *Existenz* into a new type of genteel tradition. Life becomes interesting only as it participates in the process of philosophizing, but philosophizing is a specialized activity, available only to those of a certain temperament, — a sort of aristocratic pastime to be indulged in by those of like minds while others are left to their own unlikely devices.

The difficulties appear to go back to the extravagances of

Kierkegaard's attempt to make everything depend on the absurd and then to make the absurd itself reasonably acceptable to his readers. No one will take issue with his belief that religious experience is incapable of description in wholly rational terms. But to say that it is based on the scandalously absurd, that it is an offence to reason, and that ethics can be suspended in religion, so that murder becomes devotion to the divine, is to talk nonsense. Plato's tribute to the non-rational is far more persuasive because he sets the abruptnesses and discontinuities of personal life against a background of ordered and fundamentally intelligible reality. Plato, that is, does not try to make a virtue out of disorder. Kierkegaard seems to glory in the unreasonable at the same time that he attempts, as author, to be persuasive. The actual result is that he bases his argument not on reasons but on appeals to bodily states, including those of a psychopathic nature, such as the feelings of abject creaturehood, and of fear and dread.

On the credit side the following things may be said. In the first place, we need to be reminded, in this collective age, that personal salvation does not come by collective opinion. Mass movements are here and we must learn to take account of them in our thinking. *Existenz* helps us to remember, however, that in our philosophy and our religion we are not only members of mass movements. We need to find the place and scope of such individualism as we can rightly lay claim to, and *Existenz* helps us experimentally in this effort.

Second, in this scientific age it is well to emphasize once again the differences between objective empirical facts and our subjective and emotional attitudes toward them. It is true that the idealists have always stressed what the mind does to its objects, yet for the most part their interest has centered in the epistemological problem and the specifically intellectual aspect of our relation to the outside world. *Existenz* brings once more to our notice the changes which the facts undergo for us because we are emotionally constituted as we are.

Third, *Existenz* helps us to maintain specifically personal attitudes toward our environment. Philosophy has depersonalized us by emphasizing the knowing relation to the exclusion of all

else. Practical science has mechanized our environment and turned it into a set of objects of use. Do we not need to regain directness and spontaneity in our approach to nature, to people, and to God? *Existenz* should help us to discover those features in our environment which aid the development of personal life.

Fourth, especially in Jaspers's case, it places deliberate emphasis on the unfinished element in both life and theory and prevents us from expecting our philosophy to attain complete finality. Jaspers would have us render unto science what science has a right to demand, but he would have us remember also the limiting situations which science cannot penetrate. The problem of evil is one of these. "It is ungodly," Jaspers once said to me, "to try to solve it. All that we can do is to take it into life and live it through practically as we are able." "In this sense," he said again, "I have no ontology, for ontology means a fixed, permanent state of affairs. I believe in pressing on."

Finally, *Existenz* offers no proofs for God, yet it pictures human life in a way which makes it unintelligible without God. According to its description the most significant aspect of human life is its search for the eternal. Man may not be able to read the last cipher, but he must make the effort, and the effort brings its own reward.

We began with a reference to the similarity — in the midst of all their differences — between Kierkegaard and James. We conclude by noticing that Heidegger and Jaspers also share James's individualism, his belief in freedom, his willingness to find data for philosophy in the content of human emotions, his interest in the immediate practical situation, and his conviction of the creative importance of decisive thought and action. Does this mean that the philosophical tide is again turning away from the mass man and the universal idea toward the specific insights of the individual?

HEPHAISTION OF THEBES AND CHRISTIANITY

It is now some fifty-two years since the first modern edition appeared of any part of Hephaistion of Thebes' compendium of astrology.[1] The editor very properly collected in his introduction the scanty facts relative to the author and the unknown friend to whom he dedicates his work.[2] But, apparently a little annoyed by the too positive assertion of Salmasius that all astrologers of that date were pagans, he put forth the hasty theory that this astrologer was a Christian. He had indeed no difficulty in proving that a somewhat unorthodox or lax Christian might have been a devotee of astrology at the time, about A.D. 381, when it is likely that Hephaistion wrote; but he went too far in the further statement that "das Werk des Hephaestion selbst bietet sicherlich keinen positiven Anhaltspunkt, dass der Verfasser desselben Nicht-Christ gewesen sei." This has been echoed by later writers, as A. Bouché-Leclercq,[3] who says "Il est possible qu'Hephestion de Thebes . . . fût chrétien," and Fr. Boll,[4] writing shortly before 1912, when a good deal more of our author had been printed in the C(orpus) C(odicum) A(strologicorum) G(raecorum). He sums up Engelbrecht's arguments, that the work begins σὺν θεῷ and is dedicated to one Athanasios, who is called ὁσιώτατος (and by other complimentary superlatives) and so may have been a Christian priest, concluding that the theory of the writer's Christianity is arrived at "wohl mit Recht." As it seems to me remarkable that three learned men, of whom one had edited the astrologer and the others had certainly read him, should have overlooked the cogent evidence that he was a pagan, I think it worth while to set forth the proofs, positive and negative.

Engelbrecht's arguments are of small value. As he himself rightly says, we know nothing of this Athanasios, and his name proves little. It is true that the most famous bearer of it was the canonized Bishop of Alexandria, but in itself it expresses nothing more than the hope of immortality which was shared by all the leading religions of late antiquity. While the majority of its bearers are Christian, no such thing can be asserted with any likelihood of the *genus Athanasiorum* of

[1] August Engelbrecht, Hephaestion von Theben und sein astrologisches Compendium, Wien, Verlag von Carl Konegen, 1887. This prints Bk. I only.

[2] Engelbrecht, op. cit., p. 21 sq.

[3] L'Astrologie grecque, Paris, Leroux, 1899, p. 624, n. 1.

[4] Realencyclopädie, art. Hephaistion (8).

CIL VI, 7649, the *Athenasii* (sic) of IX, 339, or the *Athan* . . . of XIV, 3400. Latin literature yields us an *auriga* of that name,[5] whose profession does not suggest very strict or fanatical Christianity, especially if (as is neither textually nor factually certain) he practiced sorcery, while the friend of Symmachus, a *uir clarissimus*, who consulted him concerning his betrothal and the troubles which arose therefrom, is at least as likely as not to have been a pagan.[6] Greek, as it happens, gives us no certain instance of anything like the right date, but there is no indication that Athanasios of Alexandria, the commentator on Hermogenes, was Christian, and we know nothing of the Athanasios who is quoted once in the scholia on Demosthenes, if he is not the same.[7] There were of course *grammatici* of both religions, as also doctors, wherefore the occurrence of the name at the head of a prescription in the Medicina Plinii [8] tells us nothing. For what it is worth, it may be mentioned that the Martyrium Sanctorum Martyrum Cypriani et Iustinae names a pagan priest Athanasios.[9] Nor is our Athanasios described by any title which proves membership in either pagan or Christian clergy. Anyone might be ὅσιος, including of course pagans (one thinks, for instance, of the Delphic Hosioi). He is never styled either ἱερεὺς or πρεσβύτερος.

That the treatise begins σὺν θεῷ proves exactly nothing about its author's religion. Quite apart from philosophic and quasi-philosophic writers from at least the time of Plato on, it is well known that the average Greek used "god," "gods," "the divine" and so forth indifferently in a great many contexts. It was, to take the first instance which comes to hand, common form to write θεός, τύχη ἀγαθῇ at the head of bills of sale relating to house property at Olynthos in the fourth century B.C.[10] I can find nothing in the language of Hephaistion's treatise which suggests familiarity with Christianity or with Biblical Greek,[11] and the following expressions are so purely pagan that, even

[5] Amm. Marc., XXIX, 3, 5.

[6] Q. Aurelius Symmachus, epist., VII, 120: the words nobis arbitris iunctae obligatione pignorum nuptiae certainly suggest that Symmachus was admitted to the family deliberations.

[7] See H. Rabe in Rhein. Mus., LXXII (1907), p. 586 sqq., LXIV (1909), p. 548 sqq. The former article, p. 587, cites for what it is worth cod. Coisl. 387, f. 153 v sqq., in a list of non-ecclesiastical writers, for an alleged medical author of that name. For the commentator on Demosthenes, see schol. Dem. XXIV, 104 (p. 117b2, Baiter-Sauppe).

[8] II, 17. See, for the Latin examples, Thesaurus II, p. 1026.

[9] Acta Sanctorum, Sept. VII 244.

[10] See the inscr. published by D. M. Robinson, Trans. Am. Phil. Ass., LXIX (1938), pp. 45, 50, 51, 52.

[11] ἀλλόφυλος, p. 57, 27 Engelbrecht, is indeed common in the LXX, but has also good

making allowance for the wide No Man's Land between the different faiths and the conventions belonging to the vocabulary of astrology, I can hardly imagine a Christian in an age when controversy was anything but dead and pagan expressions not yet harmless survivals or literary flourishes writing them or copying them down (for much of Hephaistion consists of extracts, generally not verbatim if in prose, from older authors) without revision or protest.

He speaks continually of "gods," and that in a way which suggests that he believes in them and does not think them devils, falsely deified men or any of the other stand-bys of Christian theologians when they have occasion to mention the objects of the older worship. Thus, page 58, 14–15 Engelbrecht, anyone born under the third decan of Libra shall be *εὐχρημάτιστος ἀπὸ θεῶν*, the child of the first decan of Sagittarius *κινδυνεύσας ὑπὸ θεῶν σωθήσεται*, page 61, 21; a higher destiny awaits him who is born under the third decan of Aquarius, for he *ἐκ θεῶν σπαρήσεται*, page 65, 17, consequently *ἔσται μέγας καὶ μετὰ θεῶν θρησκευθήσεται καὶ ἔσται κοσμοκράτωρ*. The planet Mercury is productive *τῶν περὶ τῶν ἱερατικῶν λόγων καὶ τὰς τῶν θεῶν θρησκείας*, page 80, 27 sq. If Mars is in Taurus when Sirius rises, it signifies *τοὺς θεοὺς προσδέξασθαι τὰς εὐχάς*, page 96, 11. If a city is founded at the right hour and season astrologically, it shall be not only *ἐνδιαίτημα βασιλέων*, but also *θεοῖς προσφιλές*, CCAG, VIII, 1, 148, 16. More than this, the singular *θεὸς* is used in a non-Christian technical sense, for on page 29, 56 Engelbrecht and often it means the god of a decan.[12] Even more convincing perhaps is the fact that *δαίμων* retains its good or neutral sense, page 56, 6, *καὶ εὐδεμονίαν ποιήσεται ὁ οἰκεῖος αὐτοῦ δαίμων καὶ τύχη*. Less is to be made of such phrases as *ἰσόθεος τιμή*, page 54, 26, or *εὐλαβὴς περὶ τὰ θεῖα*, page 56, 16. The *ἀρχιερεῖς* of page 61, 24, however, are surely pagan.

But the final and absolute proof that no Christian is writing and no Christian priest addressed is contained in the long extract printed in CCAG, VIII, 1, 150, 15 sqq., which, being still in MS. when Boll wrote (this part came out in 1929, long after Part 2 of the same volume) he cannot be blamed for not having used. In this, Hephaistion tells Athanasios that "in temples, the images must be dedicated after being constructed in the fitting shape and with the proper material likewise, as the wise Egyptians and the rest of the ancients have handed down the tradition, when the Moon is at her full phase. For so their powers

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classical and non-Christian post-classical authority from Aeschylus down, both in verse and prose, see Liddell-Scott-Jones, s.u.

[12] For the decans, see Bouché-Leclercq, op. cit., p. 215 sqq.

are made more divine and vivified (ἐμψυχοποιημέναι) when they are thus perfected, by reason of the movement of the universe." He then proceeds to give detailed instructions. For example, if the shrine be one of Tyche, the Moon should be in her own triangle and Venus in trine with her; if of the Mother of the Gods, she should be in Leo, Taurus or Capricorn; and so on for a variety of gods and goddesses, Greek and Egyptian. It needs no great acquaintance with the later cults, especially those of Alexandria, and the later theologies to see what Hephaistion refers to. It is the alleged ritual by which a statue could be made in very truth divine, as being the abode of a superhuman being: *statuas animatas*, says the author of the Asclepius, *sensu et spiritu plenas tantaque facientes et talia, statuas futurorum praescias eaque sorte, uate, somniis multisque aliis rebus praedicentes, imbecillitates hominibus facientes easque curantes, tristitiam laetitiamque pro meritis.*[13] But we also know how indignant the Christian controversialists were at such claims. St. Augustine, after quoting at length from the above passage and the lament for the coming degeneracy of Egyptian piety which follows, comments: *haec uana deceptoria perniciosa sacrilega Hermes Aegyptius, quia tempus quo auferrentur uenturum sciebat, dolebat; sed tam imprudenter dolebat quam imprudenter sciebat. non enim haec ei reuelauerat sanctus Spiritus sicut prophetis sanctis, qui haec praeuidentes cum exultatione dicebant, Si faciet homo deos, et ecce ipsi non sunt di.*[14]

I am not lost in admiration of the intelligence of Hephaistion; but I cannot imagine him such a fool and so utterly devoid of tact as to send to a Christian priest a work which assumed the truth of a doctrine so detestable to orthodox Christian teachers and contained directions for making what, to him, would be shrines and images of demons or of men idolatrously worshipped. I would rather conclude that Athanasios was himself a pagan, or if a Christian, a very free-thinking layman. That Hephaistion was a Christian no one, I hope, will any longer imagine.

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[13] Asclepius, 24 (p. 60, 16 sqq. Thomas).

[14] Augustine, de ciuit. Dei, VIII, 23 (p. 395 Hoffmann in CSEL, XL, 1). The Biblical citation is from Jeremiah, 16, 40.